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Comments
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING OR EVOLVING SCIENCE? HOW
“BAREFOOT RUNNING” DEMONSTRATES NOVEL
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING FALSE ADVERTISING
LAWSUITS UNDER STATE DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACTS
“In a sufficiently novel area of research, propositions of empirical
‘fact’ advanced in the literature may be highly controversial and
subject to rigorous debate by qualified experts.  Needless to say,
courts are ill-equipped to undertake to referee such controversies.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Vibram, Inc. introduced “FiveFingers” to the United
States market.2  In 2009, Vibram hit the jackpot, as FiveFingers be-
came the preferred accessory for one of the most popular fitness
trends to emerge in recent years: barefoot running.3  Three years
later, however, Vibram’s momentum was interrupted by a series of
consumer-initiated false advertising lawsuits.4
FiveFingers, a style of “ultra-light” or “minimalist” shoes that
are frequently analogized to a glove, were originally conceived as “a
water shoe designed for performance water sports.”5  Nevertheless,
1. ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 497 (2d Cir.
2013).
2. See Ira Boudway, FiveFingers, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www
.businessweek.com/magazine/fivefingers-08112011.html (noting that “Vibram of-
ficially launched the FiveFingers at the 2006 Boston Marathon”).  Vibram, Inc. is
an Italian-based company that since 1937 has specialized in manufacturing rubber
outsoles for “high-end hiking boots.” See Jennifer Alsever, Barefoot Shoes Try to Out-
race the Black Market, CNN MONEY (Aug. 13, 2010, 5:25 AM), http://money.cnn
.com/2010/08/13/smallbusiness/vibram_fivefingers/# (discussing Vibram’s back-
ground); History, VIBRAM, http://vibram.com/history (last visited May 20, 2015)
(providing company timeline).
3. See Boudway, supra note 2 (reporting that revenue generated by FiveFingers
skyrocketed to $11 million in 2009 as result of emerging barefoot running trend).
4. See Lisa Sokolowski, “Barefoot” Running Shoes May Pose Problems for Manufac-
turers, WEIL PRODUCT LIABILITY MONITOR (Oct. 30, 2012), http://product-liabil-
ity.weil.com/consumer-fraud-false-advertising/barefoot-running-shoes-may-pose-
problems-for-manufacturers/ (discussing significance of lawsuits filed against
Vibram in light of “skyrocketing growth of barefoot running”).
5. See Bob Parks, Is Less More?, RUNNER’S WORLD, Nov. 2010, at 76, available at
http://www.runnersworld.com/running-shoe-reviews/less-more (discussing “mini-
malist” shoes, and describing FiveFingers as “ultralight” and “foot gloves”); Jen-
(529)
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these peculiar looking shoes created an immediate buzz within a
discrete community of runners who practiced “barefoot running.”6
Soon thereafter, both FiveFingers and barefoot running garnered
mainstream interest after a barefoot running enthusiast ran the
2006 Boston Marathon in FiveFingers.7  As a result of the ensuing
publicity, FiveFingers quickly became synonymous with the practice
of barefoot running.8
In 2009, barefoot running was popularized by Christopher Mc-
Dougal’s New York Times Best Seller, Born to Run: A Hidden Tribe,
Superathletes, and the Greatest Race the World Has Never Seen (“Born to
nifer Carofano, High Five, FOOTWEAR NEWS: FN, Oct. 10 2005, 25, 25 (reporting
observations in 2005 by Tony Post, Vibram USA President, that FiveFingers were
“designed to simulate being barefoot,” and were originally intended “to be worn
for water sports, such as surfing, sailing and kayaking”).  By design, FiveFingers
“feature[ ] a proprietary sole that is designed around the shape of the foot, from
heel to each individual toe.” See Carofano, supra.  Conceptually, the shoe was con-
ceived from a proposal for a “lightweight shoe . . . that would mimic the experi-
ence of going barefoot while protecting the wearer from dirt and abrasions.” See
id.  Today, FiveFingers are encompassed within the broad category of “minimalist”
style athletic shoes, which are generally “lightweight, have little padding on the
sole, have a minimal heel rise[,] . . . are highly flexible,” and “[u]nlike a standard
running shoe, a minimalist shoe offers little or no support.” See Michael Brent,
What is Minimalist Running?, LIVESTRONG.COM (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.lives-
trong.com/article/549692-what-is-minimalist-running/ (last visited May 20, 2015)
(describing “minimalist” shoes). But see Boudway, supra note 2 (“At the moment,
no one can agree on what makes a shoe barefoot or minimal in the first place.”).
For further background on FiveFingers and “minimalist” style shoes, see generally
Scott Douglas, Minimalism in The Long Run, RUNNING TIMES, Apr. 2013, available at
http://www.runnersworld.com/barefoot-running-minimalism/minimalism-long-
run?page=single.
6. See Boudway, supra note 2 (discussing FiveFingers’ initial appeal with bare-
foot running enthusiasts).
7. See id. (describing how well-known barefoot running proponent ran 2006
Boston Marathon in FiveFingers); Anna Baskin, Vibram USA, ADVERTISING AGE,
Nov. 15 2010, 16, 16 (explaining that after FiveFingers debuted at Boston Mara-
thon, “[n]ews of the shoes began to spread quickly online; and by June 2006,
Vibram was sold out of the product”); Tara Parker-Pope, Is Barefoot Better, WALL ST.
J. (June 6, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB114955290339472060 (report-
ing in 2006 on popular running and fitness programs that endorsed running in
minimalist-style shoes).
8. To illustrate, in 2006 and 2007, a number of prominent media outlets pub-
lished articles highlighting proponents of barefoot running, and discussed FiveFin-
gers in connection with the practice. See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, Baring Their Soles:
Pain Doesn’t Defeat Unshod Marathoners, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2006), http://on-
line.wsj.com/articles/SB116718675522360186 (describing marathoners who run
barefoot and in shoes, such as FiveFingers, that “mimic the barefoot experience”);
Parker-Pope, supra note 7 (discussing doctors, trainers, and coaches who advocated
barefoot running, and describing minimalist shoes such as FiveFingers).  In addi-
tion, in 2007, FiveFingers were recognized by Time magazine as “one of the year’s
best health inventions.”  Alsever, supra note 2.
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Run”),9 and contemporaneously, it emerged as one of the hottest
fitness trends in recent years.10  The barefoot running craze was
bolstered in 2010, when a Harvard professor of evolutionary biology
published a scientific study touting the existence of unique health
benefits associated with barefoot running.11  As a result, demand
for FiveFingers skyrocketed as Vibram’s annual revenues jumped to
nearly $50 million in 2010—an increase from just $430,000 in
2006.12
By late 2010, as prominent athletic footwear manufacturers be-
gan to develop competing lines of minimalist-style shoes, Vibram
launched its first national marketing campaign to promote FiveFin-
gers.13  Over the next few years, Vibram’s marketing efforts focused
on three themes: (1) promoting the practice of barefoot running;
(2) touting FiveFingers as a barefoot running accessory; and (3)
distinguishing Vibram as “a leader in the barefoot running move-
ment,” with a “strong commitment to research and innovation.”14
In that regard, Vibram widely promoted the unique health benefits
ascribed to barefoot running.15
In light of its widespread popularity, certain groups within the
scientific community began to question the existence of barefoot
9. CHRISTOPHER MCDOUGALL, BORN TO RUN: A HIDDEN TRIBE, SUPERATHLETES,
AND THE GREATEST RACE THE WORLD HAS NEVER SEEN (2011).
10. See Boudway, supra note 2 (noting that Born to Run “widely regarded as
catalyst for barefoot boom”).
11. Daniel E. Lieberman et al., Foot Strike Patterns and Collision Forces in Habit-
ual Barefoot Versus Shod Runners, 463 NATURE 531 (2010); see Ashley Fantz, Running
Debate: Bare or In Shoes?, CNN (Feb. 12, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/HEALTH/02/12/barefoot.running/ (stating in 2010 that Lieberman’s
study was “stirring the most buzz”); Richard A. Lovett, Daniel Lieberman, 10 Years
After “Born to Run”, RUNNING TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.runnersworld
.com/barefoot-running/daniel-lieberman-10-years-after-born-to-run (contending
that Lieberman “helped inspire the barefoot running movement”).  For a discus-
sion of Lieberman’s 2010 study, see infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
12. See Alsever, supra note 2 (reporting that FiveFingers’ sales generated reve-
nue of $430,000 in 2006, and $11 million in 2009); Brian Metzler, The 8 Essentials of
Barefoot Running, OUTSIDE (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.outsideonline.com/
1871911/8-essentials-barefoot-running (reporting that FiveFingers’ sales generated
revenue of $50 million in 2010).
13. See Baskin, supra note 7 (reporting that in November 2010, Vibram would
launch its first traditional advertising campaign to promote FiveFingers).  By 2010,
Nike was already selling a “lightweight shoe called Nike Free . . . . [while] as many
as six more competitors, including Merrell and New Balance,” were preparing to
“enter the market with so-called ‘barefoot’ shoes.’” See Alsever, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing how athletic footwear manufacturers began introducing competing lines of
minimalist shoes in 2010).
14. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (discussing FiveFingers mar-
keting campaign).
15. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing how Vibram pro-
moted health benefits ascribed to barefoot running).
3
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running’s purported health benefits.16  In that connection, in 2012,
several consumers brought false advertising lawsuits against Vibram
under state deceptive trade practices acts (“DTPAs”).17  These puta-
tive class actions broadly alleged that Vibram’s FiveFingers market-
ing campaign touted the existence of health benefits associated
with barefoot running that did not exist or were otherwise unsub-
stantiated by scientific evidence.18  Vibram moved to dismiss the
claims against it, contending, inter alia, that the factual allegations
in support of these claims did not establish instances of false or
unsubstantiated advertising, but merely suggested “that there is . . .
a dispute in the scientific community regarding the potential health
benefits” associated with barefoot running.19  In Bezdek v. Vibram
USA, Inc.20 and De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc.21 (collectively, “Vibram
Lawsuits”), two federal district courts rejected that argument and
respectively denied Vibram’s motions to dismiss.22  Subsequently,
16. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of bare-
foot running in scientific literature).
17. See sources cited infra note 18 (complaints filed against Vibram); infra
notes 85-106 and accompanying text (discussing allegations against Vibram); see
also Sokolowski, supra note 4 (“Despite the skyrocketing growth of barefoot run-
ning, all new fads have their detractors, and several lawsuits have already been filed
against companies that produce and market these shoes.”).
18. See Amended Complaint paras. 68, 73, Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No.
12-10513, 2012 WL 2398011 (D. Mass. June 25, 2012) [hereinafter Amended Com-
plaint, Bezdek] (alleging that Vibram made false or deceptive advertising statements
regarding health benefits associated with FiveFingers and barefoot running); Com-
plaint paras. 83-84, Safavi v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-5900 (C.D. Cal. filed July 9,
2012) (same); Complaint paras. 78-79, De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C
7238 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, De Falco] (same).
19. De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C 7238, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2013); see Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL
639145, at *9 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (“Defendants also argue that the allegations
reflect merely a difference in opinion in the scientific community as to barefoot
running, and that Vibram has scientific support for its advertising.”); Defendants
Vibram USA Inc. and Vibram FiveFingers LLC’s Notice of Motion and Motion to
Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motions to Dismiss
at 9, Safavi v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-05900 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 30, 2012)
[hereinafter Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Safavi] (“Taken as a whole, Plaintiff’s
accusations here are no more than his side of a difference of opinion about the
benefits of barefoot running . . . .  In fact, Plaintiff does not dispute that there are
studies touting the benefits of barefoot running, and his Complaint even acknowl-
edges those studies.”).
20. No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145 (D. Mass Feb. 20, 2013).
21. No. 12 C 7238, 2013 WL 1122825 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2013).
22. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *10 (denying Vibram’s motion to dismiss);
De Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (denying Vibram’s motion to dismiss).  In Safavi
v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-5900 (C.D. Cal. filed July 9, 2012), Vibram also moved
to dismiss the claims against it. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Safavi, supra
note 19.  However, during the pendency of Vibram’s motion, the parties stipulated
to stay the Safavi action pending a ruling on class certification in the Bezdek action,
and subsequently stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit after the Safavi plaintiff was in-
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the company agreed to settle the lawsuits against it for $3.75 mil-
lion, citing the “burden and expense of continued litigation.”23
Taken together, the Vibram Lawsuits and the surrounding cir-
cumstances raise a number of novel issues that pose unique chal-
lenges for companies such as Vibram.  First, it is unclear how
evolving scientific research informs a manufacturer’s advertising re-
sponsibilities in connection with innovative products or indus-
tries.24  Moreover, the law is ambiguous regarding the extent to
which a defendant manufacturer may be held liable for affirmative
product claims when the truthfulness of such claims is a matter of
scientific debate.25  Second, class action lawsuits under state DTPAs
are increasingly prevalent, and commentators predict that produc-
ers of consumer goods will continue to be targeted by such law-
suits.26  In that regard, due to the nominal requirements to bring
corporated into Vibram’s proposed settlement agreement. See Settlement Agree-
ment at 1, Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 30, 2014)
(detailing proposed settlement agreement between Vibram and Bezdek, De Falco,
and Safavi plaintiffs).  Accordingly, for purposes of this Comment’s analysis, gen-
eral references to the “Vibram Lawsuits” will refer only to the Bezdek and De Falco
actions.
23. Vibram to Pay $3.75 Million to Settle Class Action Over ‘Toed’ Running Shoes, 25
NO. 5 WESTLAW J. PRODUCT LIABILITY 2, June 10, 2014, at *1, available at 2014 WL
2586891 (recounting terms and conditions of proposed settlement agreement); see
Second Amended Settlement Agreement, Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-
10513 (D. Mass. May 12, 2014); see also Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., —- F. Supp. 3d.
—-, Nos. 12-10513, 13-10764, 2015 WL 223786 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2015) (allowing
plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of proposed class settlement).
24. See Sokolowski, supra note 4 (“To what extent . . . should the evolution of
scientific knowledge about barefoot running shoes impact the manufacturer’s ad-
vertising responsibilities?”).  For an interesting discussion of related issues con-
nected with FTC enforcement of advertising substantiation requirements against
fitness equipment manufacturers, generally see Heather M. Mandelkehr, Com-
ment, When Toning Shoes Strengthen Nothing More Than Likelihood of Lawsuit: Why The
Federal Trade Commission Needs Guidelines Regarding Proper Substantiation of Fitness Ad-
vertisements, 20 MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 297 (2013).  Mandelkehr highlights, among
other things, the challenges caused by the lack of concrete standards regarding the
required level of substantiation for “fitness claims” in advertisements. See id. at 327-
30.
25. See Sokolowski, supra note 4 (observing that Vibram Lawsuits “raise an in-
teresting question: to what extent can a defendant be liable for claims made about
a product when the truthfulness of those claims is a matter of scientific debate?”).
26. See, e.g., Theodora McCormick, The Rise and Possible Fall of Class Actions in
False-Advertising Litigation, 23 No. 10 WESTLAW J. PRODUCT LIABILITY 11, Nov. 12,
2012, at *1-2, available at 2012 WL 5497383 (noting recent influx of false advertis-
ing class actions against consumer product manufacturers).  At least one commen-
tator has specifically noted that the Vibram Lawsuits may represent “a larger trend”
of lawsuits concerning advertising practices within the athletic footwear industry.
See Sokolowski, supra note 4 (contending that fitness industry becoming frequent
target of consumer class actions).  Indeed, both private lawsuits and FTC investiga-
tions have targeted a number of athletic footwear manufacturers in recent years.
See Sketchers Agrees to Pay $40 Million in ‘Toning Shoe Suit’: FTC v. Sketchers U.S.A.,
5
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consumer fraud claims in many states, as well as the lack of uniform
compliance standards, even diligent companies may face substantial
discovery, litigation, and settlement costs associated with defending
such claims.27  Consequently, in addition to providing their clients
with ex-ante counseling regarding compliance with advertising laws,
defense attorneys must consider novel strategies to combat such
claims that do arise at the early stages of litigation.28
This Comment contends that the allegations against Vibram
provide a useful platform to demonstrate how two emerging legal
theories may provide viable strategies to efficiently defend against
comparable future lawsuits.  Specifically, where consumer false ad-
vertising claims under state DTPAs rely on a lack of substantiation
theory of liability, or such claims involve matters of scientific de-
bate, defendants may successfully argue: (1) private plaintiffs lack
standing to bring claims based on unsubstantiated advertising;29
and (2) as a matter of law, advertising claims cannot form the basis
of a false advertising lawsuit where the truthfulness of such claims is
the subject of an evolving debate in the scientific community.30
Part II of this Comment provides background on the barefoot
running trend, the associated debate in the scientific community,
and the FiveFingers marketing campaign.31  Part III examines the
Vibram Lawsuits, assessing the Plaintiffs’ allegations, Vibram’s argu-
ments, and the courts’ analysis in connection with Vibram’s mo-
tions to dismiss.32  Part IV discusses the sources of false advertising
law and the enforcement thereof, focusing on the distinct roles of
23 NO. 5 WESTLAW J. PRODUCT LIABILITY 1, Jun. 11, 2012, available at 2012 WL
2090420 (discussing settlement of FTC deceptive advertising lawsuit against
Sketchers); Trade Regulation Reports Letter No. 1224, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), Oct. 5,
2011, available at 2011 WL 9381760 (discussing settlement of FTC deceptive adver-
tising lawsuit against Reebok); Complaint, Rocco v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 1:12-
03015 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 15, 2012) (alleging that Adidas’ advertisements for
adiPURE line of minimalist shoes were deceptive in violation of Pennsylvania and
Oregon DTPAs).
27. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *3-4 (describing difficult choice of
whether to litigate or settle false advertising class actions).
28. See infra notes 308-315 (suggesting that practitioners pursue strategies to
resolve false advertising claims at early stages of litigation).
29. For background and analysis of the “unsubstantiated advertising” defense
theory, see infra notes 176-242 and accompanying text.
30. For background and analysis of the “matters of scientific debate” defense
theory, see infra notes 243-307 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the barefoot running trend, the corresponding debate
in the scientific community, and Vibram’s efforts to market FiveFingers, see infra
notes 37-83 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the Vibram Lawsuits, see infra notes 84-116 and accom-
panying text.
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administrative enforcement under federal law, and private enforce-
ment through consumer lawsuits under state law.33  Part V utilizes
the Vibram Lawsuits to analyze two emerging legal theories as strat-
egies to defend against similar claims.34  Part VI discusses the
broader legal trends surrounding the Vibram Lawsuits, and sug-
gests ways for companies to address emerging challenges both
before and after litigation arises.35  Finally, part VII briefly con-
cludes by emphasizing the broader significance of the novel issues
associated with the Vibram Lawsuits, and correspondingly, the im-
portance of exploring new strategies to defend against comparable
future claims.36
II. “STRONG COMMITMENT TO RESEARCH AND INNOVATION”:
VIBRAM FIVEFINGERS, THE BAREFOOT RUNNING CRAZE,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC DEBATE
A. The Emergence of Barefoot Running
Although the practice of barefoot running is “newly popular,”
it is not a novel concept.37  Sneakers were not developed until the
early 1900s, “and running shoes only came into widespread use in
the 1970s.”38  Before then, runners generally wore shoes with mini-
mal cushioning and low heels or, in some instances, ran barefoot.39
33. For an assessment of advertising regulation and enforcement under state
and federal law, see infra notes 117-164 and accompanying text.
34. For background and analysis of the “unsubstantiated advertising” and
“matters of scientific debate” defense theories, see infra notes 165-307 and accom-
panying text.
35. For suggested strategies for practitioners, see infra notes 308-336 and ac-
companying text.
36. For concluding observations addressing the recent influx of false advertis-
ing lawsuits under state DTPAs, see infra notes 337-339 and accompanying text.
37. See Katie Thomas, Running Shoes. Singlet. Shoes?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/sports/03barefoot.html (quoting Runner’s
World magazine editor-in-chief David Wiley’s 2010 observation that “[t]his
barefooting thing isn’t new, but it is newly popular”).
38. Kelly Murphy et al., Barefoot Running: Does It Prevent Injuries?, 43 SPORTS
MEDICINE 1131, 1131 (Nov. 2013) (providing historic overview of runners and ath-
letic footwear); see JASON ROBILLARD, THE BAREFOOT RUNNING BOOK 19-20 (Dirk
Wierenga ed., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing emergence of “sports shoes” in early twenti-
eth century).
39. See Murphy et al., supra note 38, at 1131-32 (describing footwear worn by
runners before development of modern running shoes); Running Barefoot: Running
Before the Modern Running Shoe, RUNNING BAREFOOT (HARVARD UNIVERSITY SKELETAL
BIOLOGY LAB), http://www.barefootrunning.fas.harvard.edu/3RunningBeforeThe
ModernShoe.html (last visited May 21, 2015) (“Before [the 1970s], running shoes
were just simple running flats that had little cushioning, no arch support, and no
built-up heel.  Humans were running for millions of years . . . in running flats, in
thin sandals or moccasins, or in no shoes at all.”).  More recent examples include
Australian middle distance runner Herb Elliott, who was pictured running bare-
7
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Nevertheless, when Vibram introduced FiveFingers to the U.S. mar-
ket in 2005, the practice of barefoot running was largely con-
strained to a discrete sect of avid runners.40
Barefoot running’s popular reemergence is widely attributed
to Christopher McDougal’s 2009 book, Born to Run, which spent
more than four years on the New York Times Best Seller List.41  In
Born to Run, McDougal, an award winning journalist and avid run-
ner, tells the story of the Tarahumara tribe of Mexico, and de-
scribes the Tarahumara’s ability to run extraordinarily long
distances through rough terrain, barefoot or wearing only home-
made sandals.42  McDougal attributed this ability to the fact that the
Tarahumara landed on their feet in a “forefoot strike.”43  Contem-
poraneously, the emergent trend was bolstered by a highly publi-
cized study in which Daniel E. Lieberman, a Harvard Professor of
Evolutionary Biology, suggested the existence of unique health ben-
efits associated with barefoot running.44
foot on the cover of Sports Illustrated in 1958, as well as Ethiopian marathoner
Abebe Bikila, who famously won the marathon gold medal while running barefoot
at the 1960 Olympics.  C.S., Bare Facts, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 2011), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2011/09/running-fads (providing exam-
ples of barefoot runners who predated the recent fitness trend).
40. See Boudway, supra note 2 (describing practice of barefoot running prior
to 2009 as “[a] subculture of distance runners who considered the average shoe to
be an affront to the human foot”).
41. See id. (describing how Born to Run is “widely regarded as the catalyst for
the barefoot boom”); Brian Metzler, Five Years Later: The Legacy of ‘Born to Run’,
COMPETITOR.COM (last updated May 4, 2014), http://running.competitor.com/
2014/05/news/the-legacy-of-born-to-run_72044 (noting that Born to Run “re-
mained on the New York Times bestseller list for more than four years”).
42. See generally MCDOUGAL, supra note 9; see also Dan Zak, Book Review: ‘Born to
Run’ by Christopher McDougall, WASH. POST (June 21, 2009), available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/19/AR2009061901078
.html (recounting that Born to Run describes how Tarahumara’s basic “diet . . . and
racing method (upright posture, flicking heels, clear-headedness) would place
them among elite runners of the developed world even though their society and
technology are 500 years behind it”).
43. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 9, at 101-03 (describing Tarahumara’s running
style).  McDougal utilized his discussion of the Tarahumara as a basis for contend-
ing that modern running shoes are detrimental to runners with regard to effi-
ciency and running-related injuries. See generally id. at 161-282 (criticizing modern
running shoes, and advancing benefits of running barefoot or in minimalist
shoes); see also id. at 168 (asserting that “running shoes may be the most destructive
force to ever hit the human foot”).
44. See Alsever, supra note 2 (describing Lieberman’s 2010 study as significant
factor in popular emergence of barefoot running).  Commentators have also at-
tributed the initial revival of barefoot running among ardent practitioners to Lie-
berman’s 2004 study, Endurance Running and the Evolution of Homo, 432 NATURE 345
(2004). See, e.g., Bare Facts, supra note 39 (“The recent renaissance began when
Daniel Lieberman, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard University, published a
study of barefoot runners in Nature, a science journal, in 2004.”).  For a discussion
8
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In light of this publicity, barefoot running quickly gained a fol-
lowing.45  By way of illustration, in 2009, a small group of barefoot
running enthusiasts formed the Barefoot Runners Society to “con-
nect with others who share the same passion.”46  Between 2009 and
2015, the society grew to encompass over ninety chapters, while
popular media outlets consistently touted barefoot running (and
minimalist shoes such as FiveFingers) as a “top fitness trend.”47
In addition to becoming a trendy alternative to the gym, the
barefoot running craze created a thriving market for so-called “min-
imalist shoes.”48  Beginning in 2009, Vibram’s profits skyrocketed as
demand for FiveFingers escalated.49  By 2010, prominent athletic
footwear manufacturers hustled to capitalize on the lucrative mar-
ket by developing their own lines of minimalist shoes.50  Thus, over
the course of 2011, Vibram responded to increasing consumer de-
mand for FiveFingers and heightened competition for its market-
share by expanding from one to five factories, tripling the size of its
of recent studies of barefoot running by Lieberman and others, see infra notes 52-
68 and accompanying text.
45. See Alsever, supra note 2 (describing barefoot running’s emergence as
popular fitness trend).
46. ROBILLARD, supra note 38, at 180.
47. See Chapters, BAREFOOT RUNNERS SOCIETY, http://www.thebarefootrunners
.org/social-categories/chapters.113/ (listing ninety-four chapters by geographic
location) (last visited May 21, 2015); Barbi Lieberman, The Best Summer Workout
Trends & 3 Strong & Sexy Moves, SELF MAG. (June 23, 2011), http://www.self.com/
flash/fitness-blog/2011/06/best-summer-workout-trends/ (listing barefoot run-
ning as among top fitness trends for summer 2011); Caitlin McCarthy et al., Like
Barefoot, Only Better?, AM. COUNCIL ON EXERCISE CERTIFIED NEWS (Sept. 2011),
http://www.acefitness.org/certifiednewsarticle/1641/like-barefoot-only-better/
(describing minimalist shoes as among “hottest” footwear trends in recent years);
see also Thomas, supra note 37 (reporting in 2010 that Barefoot Runners Society’s
membership more than doubled from 680 to 1,345 in previous year).
48. See Cynthia Billhartz Gregorian, Barefoot Running: Sales Grow, But So Does
Debate About Benefits, Safety, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 29, 2011, 12:10 AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/fitness/barefoot-running-sales-
grow-but-so-does-debate-about-benefits/article_160a8a80-16eb-55c9-97cc-063b480b
3ada.html (reporting that minimalist-style running shoes grew to become $1.7 bil-
lion industry in 2010); Kent Youngblood, Minimal Sole, but Maximum Results for
Runners, SEATTLE TIMES (July 1, 2012, 7:31 AM) (reporting that monthly revenues
generated by minimalist shoe sales more than doubled from previous year); see also
Boudaway, supra note 2 (describing how minimalist shoes constituted nominal
share of running shoe market in 2008, but accounted for nine percent of same
market by 2011).
49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing FiveFingers’ sales revenue
generated by FiveFingers between 2006-2010).
50. See supra, note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Vibram’s emerging
competition in 2010).
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Boston warehouse and office, and launching its first traditional
print advertising campaign.51
B. Evolving Scientific Knowledge: The Debate
Over Barefoot Running
In January 2010, Lieberman published a study in the interna-
tional scientific journal Nature, containing evidence that the prac-
tice of barefoot running was associated with unique health benefits
and a decreased rate of running related injuries.52  Entitled Foot
Strike Patterns and Collision Forces in Habitually Barefoot Versus Shod
Runners,53 Lieberman’s study compared the foot strike mechanics
of habitually barefoot runners with runners who have worn shoes
their entire lives.54
Lieberman contended that many running related injuries are
connected with the impact of the foot striking the ground.55  In
light of his findings, Lieberman further concluded that the majority
of endurance runners who wear modern running shoes strike the
ground with their heel, whereas habitually barefoot runners typi-
cally strike with their fore-foot or mid-foot.56  In that regard, Lieber-
51. See Alsever, supra note 2 (reporting 2010 statement by Tony Post, Vibram
CEO, that “Vibram must expand quickly enough to keep from losing shelf space to
competitors”); Baskin, supra note 7 (reporting that Vibram would begin its first
print advertising campaign in November 2010).
52. See generally, Lieberman et al., supra note 11.
53. Lieberman et al., supra note 11.
54. See id. at 534 (describing methodology of Lieberman’s study).  In the
course of his study, Lieberman evaluated “five subject groups, both indoors and
outdoors at endurance speed between 4 to 6 meters per second.” See Michael San-
dler, New Study by Dr. Daniel Lieberman on Barefoot Running Makes Cover Story in Na-
ture Journal, RUNBARE, http://runbare.com/389/new-study-by-dr-daniel-lieber
man-on-barefoot-running-makes-cover-story-in-nature-journal (last visited May 21,
2015).
The groups included three adult groups, first habitually barefoot runners
from the US, runners from the Rift Valley Province of Kenya who grew up
barefoot but now run primarily in cushioned shoes . . . and US runners
who grew up in shoes but now run primarily barefoot or in minimalist
footwear.
Id.  The subject groups also included two groups of Kenyan teenagers, “the first
who have never worn shoes and the second who have worn shoes their entire
lives.” Id.  The purpose of Lieberman’s study was evaluate differences in the “foot
strike mechanics” – essentially how the foot lands on the ground, and the amount
of impact that results – between those who run barefoot and those who run in
cushioned shoes. See Lieberman et al., supra note 11, at 531 (“We wondered how
runners coped with the impact caused by the foot colliding with the ground before
the invention of the modern running shoe.”).
55. See Lieberman et al., supra note 11, at 531 (“Running can be most injuri-
ous at the moment the foot collides with the ground.”).
56. See id. (discussing findings with regard to differences in “foot strike
mechanics” between those who run barefoot and those who run in cushioned
10
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man submitted that habitual barefoot runners strike the ground
with one-third of the impact of those who run in cushioned shoes
with a rear-foot strike.57  Correspondingly, Lieberman, as well as
others in the scientific community, has presented evidence that
running in cushioned shoes weakens foot muscles and reduces arch
strength, whereas running barefoot with a forefoot strike strength-
ens foot muscles and increases arch strength.58  Accordingly, he
proposed that barefoot runners would likely experience lower rates
of stress related injuries.59
After Born to Run caught the national spotlight in 2009, Lieber-
man’s study garnered considerable publicity, and was widely touted
shoes).  Lieberman’s study assumed that foot “collision” with the ground can occur
in three ways: “a rear-foot strike . . . in which the heel lands first; a mid-foot
strike . . . in which the heel and the ball of the foot land simultaneously; and a fore-
foot strike . . . in which the ball of the foot lands before the heel.” See id.  Based on
his study, Lieberman concluded, “habitually barefoot endurance runners often
land on the fore-foot . . . before bringing down the heel, but they sometimes land
with a flat foot . . . or, less often, on the heel.” See id.  By contrast, runners who
habitually run in cushioned shoes “mostly rear foot strike,” which Lieberman sug-
gests is because “shoes with elevated, cushioned heels facilitate [rear-foot strike]
running.” See id.
57. See id. at 532 (“At similar speeds, magnitudes of peak vertical force during
the impact period . . . are approximately three times lower in habitual barefoot
runners who [fore-foot strike] than in habitually shod runners who [rear-foot
strike] either barefoot or in shoes.”).  Lieberman suggested that the reason for the
distinction is that modern running shoes encourage runners to rear-foot strike. See
id. at 534 (“Although cushioned, high-heeled running shoes are comfortable,
they . . . make it easier for runners to land on their heels.”).
58. For example, Lieberman noted that modern running shoes “have arch
support and stiffened soles that may lead to weaker foot muscles, reducing arch
strength.” See id.  Lieberman argues that “[t]his weakness contributes to excessive
pronation and places greater demands on the plantar fascia, which may cause
planter fasciitis.” See id.  Conversely, Lieberman and others have found that bare-
foot running may strengthen foot muscles and increase arch strength, leading to
reduced rates of running-related injuries. See Running Barefoot: Training Tips, RUN-
NING BAREFOOT (HARVARD UNIVERSITY SKELETAL BIOLOGY LAB), http://barefoot-
running.fas.harvard.edu/5BarefootRunning&TrainingTips.html (last visited May
21, 2015) (asserting that running barefoot with forefoot strike “strengthens the
muscles in your foot, especially the arch”); Elizabeth E. Miller et al., The Effect of
Minimal Shoes on Arch Structure and Intrinsic Foot Muscle Strength, J. SPORT & HEALTH
SCI., June 2014, 74, 74 (concluding based on comparative study with runners wear-
ing “traditional running footwear,” that “endurance running in minimal support
footwear . . . strengthen[s] the foot”).
59. See Lieberman et al., supra note 11, at 532 (contending that running with
a fore-foot or mid-foot strike “may protect the feet and lower limbs from some of
the impact related injuries now experienced by a high percentage of runners,” and
that rates of impact associated with rear-foot striking “may contribute to the high
incidence of running-related injuries”); id. at 534 (citing “anecdotal reports of re-
duced injuries in barefoot populations”); see also id. at 534 (“Evidence that barefoot
and minimally shod runners avoid [rear foot] strikes with high-impact collisions
may have public health implications.”).
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by supporters of the barefoot running movement.60  While Lieber-
man’s publication was novel insofar as it derived evidence from a
comparative study of barefoot runners, several academics explored
similar hypotheses in the preceding decades.61  Between 1987 and
2010, scientific journals published several studies that rejected the
assumption that modern running shoes decrease the rate of run-
ning-related injuries.62  Other studies concluded that performing
high-impact activities in running shoes could create a higher risk of
injury, or could be less efficient than performing the same activities
barefoot.63
By contrast, critical assessments of barefoot running largely
emerged in scholarly literature only after the practice gained a pop-
ular following.64  In that regard, certain members of the scientific
community critiqued Lieberman’s findings and cautioned that
barefoot running may encompass unique health risks.65  Others re-
jected the notion that certain health benefits, such as strengthening
the foot’s intrinsic muscles, were associated with barefoot run-
ning.66  Nevertheless, the apparent majority within the scientific
community has declined to take a firm stance on the efficacies of
60. See sources cited supra note 11.
61. See generally Alex Hutchinson, The Biomechanical Case for Minimalist Run-
ning, SWEAT SCI. — RUNNER’S WORLD (May 13, 2013), http://www.runnersworld
.com/barefoot-running-minimalism/the-biomechanical-case-for-minimalist-run-
ning (summarizing studies of barefoot running).
62. See, e.g., Steven E. Robbins & Gerard J. Gouw, Athletic Footwear: Unsafe Due
to Perceptual Illusions, MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE, Feb. 1991, at 217, 223 (con-
cluding that “people who perform activities involving high impact while wearing
footwear currently promoted as offering protection in this environment are at
high risk for injury”).
63. See, e.g., Steven E. Robbins & Adel M. Hanna, Running-Related Injury Pre-
vention Through Barefoot Adaptations, MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE, Apr. 1987, at
148, 155 (“The solution to the problem of running-related injuries could be as
simple as promoting barefoot activity.”); Michael Warburton, Barefoot Running,
SPORTSSCIENCE, Dec. 2001, at 1, 6 (asserting that “[r]unning in shoes appears to
increase the risk of ankle sprains[,] . . . . plantar fasciitis and other chronic injuries
of the lower limb” ).
64. See, e.g., Roger Collier, The Rise of Barefoot Running, 183 CMAJ NO. 1 (Dec.
6, 2010), available at http://www.cmaj.ca/content/183/1/E37 (quoting Craig
Payne, senior podiatry lecturer at Australian university, as stating “[t]he barefoot
running community . . . misinterpret[s], misuse[s] and misquote[s] research”).
65. See, e.g., Jeffery A. Rixe et al., The Barefoot Debate. Can Minimalist Shoes Re-
duce Running-Related Injuries?, CURRENT SPORTS MED. REP., May/Jun. 2012, at 160,
162 (summarizing that “[o]pponents of ‘barefoot’ running maintain that the ‘min-
imalist’ style may alter the type not incidence of running injuries”).
66. See, e.g., Brian J. Krabak et al., Barefoot Running, PM&R, Dec. 2011, at 1142,
1148-49 (asserting that “[i]t should be obvious that foot intrinsic muscle strength-
ening cannot be a potential benefit from barefoot running”).
12
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barefoot running, at least until further studies are conducted.67  In-
deed, the American Podiatric Medical Association has taken the of-
ficial position that, “research has not yet adequately shed light on
the immediate and long-term effects of [the] practice.”68
C. Vibram and the FiveFingers Marketing Campaign
Although FiveFingers were originally designed as an accessory
for boating and performance watersports, Vibram USA President
Tony Post soon realized that FiveFingers could appeal to a broader
audience.69  Prior to the American release of FiveFingers in 2005,
Post described the shoes as “innovative,” and revealed that Vibram
was “searching for progressive retailers.”70  He noted, for example,
that FiveFingers had “garnered interest from yoga professionals,
climbers and campers looking for a comfortable shoe.”71
In 2005, Vibram hired Tommasi PR, a small public relations
firm, to promote FiveFingers.72  Like Post, Tommasi believed that
beyond watersports, FiveFingers “offered potential for other appli-
cations including fitness training and running.”73  Accordingly,
Tommasi arranged for mainstream running publications to review
FiveFingers, “secured testing and placement in the top running and
fitness blogs,” and took further steps to “put Vibram on the fore-
front of the barefoot/minimalist running trend.”74  Similarly, be-
67. See, e.g., Benno Nigg, Biomechanical Considerations on Barefoot Movement and
Barefoot Shoe Concepts, FOOTWEAR SCI., June 2009, at 73 (“We suggest that nobody
knows at this point in time whether or not people running barefoot have more or
less injuries than people running with conventional running shoes.”); Rixe et al.,
supra note 65, at 164 (“The continued controversy over the efficacy of barefoot
versus shod running and the associated impact on injury rates necessitates more
outcomes-based research.”).
68. See APMA Position Statement on Barefoot Running, APMA, http://www.apma
.org/Media/position.cfm?ItemNumber=995 (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter APMA Position Statement] (stating that “[r]esearch is ongoing in regards to the
risks and benefits of barefoot running”).
69. See Carofano, supra note 5, at 25 (describing Post’s 2005 vision for FiveFin-
gers in U.S. market).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Case Study: Vibram FiveFingers, TOMMASI PUB. REL., http://tommasipr
.com/case-study/ (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinafter Tommasi Case Study] (re-
counting assignment to promote FiveFingers).
73. See id.  Because FiveFingers were “initially designed as watersports and
boating footwear,” Tommasi’s strategy was to first, hit the “water sports market
hard,” and then to “[p]ursue the emerging running and fitness market.” See id.
74. Id.  For example, Tommasi attempted to associate FiveFingers with the
emerging barefoot running movement by “[p]ositioning CEO and President Tony
Post as a leader in key spokesmen for the natural running and training move-
ment,” and sponsoring “Barefoot Ted” – a popular blogger and barefoot running
enthusiast who ran the 2006 Boston Marathon in FiveFingers. See id. (describing
13
Calo: Deceptive Advertising or Evolving Science? How "Barefoot Running"
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 103 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 103 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 14 27-JUL-15 10:27
542 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 529
tween 2006 and 2009, after FiveFingers had gained notoriety among
barefoot running enthusiasts, Vibram focused its marketing efforts
on developing FiveFingers’ “brand look and personality” as an ex-
tension of barefoot running.75  As a result, when McDougal’s best-
selling book ignited the barefoot running craze, FiveFingers were
effectively perceived as synonymous with the practice.76
By 2010, Vibram faced emerging competition for its stake in
the minimalist shoe market, and accordingly launched its first tradi-
tional advertising campaign.77  Previously, Vibram’s marketing ef-
forts were limited to word of mouth, product placement, and other
non-traditional advertising techniques.78  Correspondingly, its for-
how Tommasi “worked diligently and creatively to put Vibram on the forefront of
the barefoot/minimalist running trend”); Boudway, supra note 2 (discussing spon-
sorship of “Barefoot Ted”).
75. Vibram FiveFingers Brand Image Development, TOMLINSON LLC, http://www
.tomlinson-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Vibram-Tomlinson-Case-Study
.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015) (“In 2006 Tomlinson was asked to help create the
brand look and feel for Vibram FiveFingers and to develop a distinctive personality
for this offbeat, unconventional footwear.”); see Judy Leand, Pushing the Limits,
SGB, June 2007, at 32, 32 (reporting in 2007 that FiveFingers was “gaining popular-
ity among barefoot runners (as well as sailors, climbers, hikers and other ath-
letes),” and that “barefoot running proponents believe that the [practice]
improves performance and helps reduce injuries”).  Post recounted in 2010, “We
knew we needed to develop a positioning and decided on fitness training.”  Baskin,
supra note 7 (discussing development of FiveFingers marketing strategy).  In 2006,
Vibram also hired Tomlinson LLC, a Massachusetts-based marketing agency, to
help develop a distinctive “image” for the FiveFingers brand. See Vibram FiveFingers
Brand Image Development, supra (describing assignment to promote FiveFingers).
Tomlinson explains that the “core brand promise was . . . [to] provide the sensa-
tion and benefits of being barefoot with the protection and superior grip of a
Vibram sole.” See id.  Accordingly, Tomlinson utilized the Vibram website, in-store
displays, and print and digital brochures to portray FiveFingers as an “alternative
to conventional footwear” for running, fitness and other outdoor activities. See id.
(providing portfolio of FiveFingers marketing materials).
76. See Brand Development, NZ MARKETING MAG., May/Jun. 2011, at 62 (observ-
ing in 2011 that after Born to Run “became a best-seller and sparked a massive
worldwide craze in barefoot running . . . .  Vibram has been careful to keep [Five-
Fingers] close to the mystery of the book”); see also Morgan Campbell, Minimalist
Running Shoes: Slumping Sales, Lasting Legacy, TORONTO STAR (June 5, 2013), http:/
/www.thestar.com/business/2013/06/05/minimalist_running_shoes_slumping_
sales_lasting_legacy.html (“When the 2009 book Born to Run made a compelling
case that long-distance running without shoes provided a long list of health bene-
fits, new converts boosted sales of [FiveFingers].”).
77. See sources cited supra, note 13 and accompanying text (discussing
Vibram’s emerging competition in 2010); Baskin, supra note 7 (reporting that
Vibram would launch its first traditional advertising campaign to promote FiveFin-
gers in November 2010).
78. See Baskin, supra note 7 (stating in 2010 that Vibram “to date” had not
utilized “traditional advertising”); see also Jennifer Alsever, Fighting Fake FiveFingers,
INC. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201203/jennifer-alsever/
fighting-fake-fivefingers.html (reporting statement by Tony Post that “we hit $50
million in sales without a single advertisement”).
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mal marketing efforts largely focused on promoting the practice of
barefoot running as well its purported health benefits.79  Moreover,
Vibram made efforts through its marketing campaign to distinguish
itself as “a leader in the barefoot running movement,” and to edu-
cate the public with regard to the practice.80  Notably, Vibram’s ini-
tial print advertisements were intended to promote its microsite,
youarethetechnology.com, which demonstrated “how the human
body is built for running.”81  In 2012, Vibram also added educa-
tional resources to its official website, which Post ascribed to
Vibram’s “strong commitment to research and innovation.”82  Post
explained, “[w]ith all the vital health benefits in utilizing a mini-
malist fitness routine, we felt a resource with informational articles,
79. See David Gianatasio, Vibram Enlists Nail for FiveFingers Launch, ADWEEK
(Jan. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/
vibram-enlists-nail-fivefingers-launch-101251 (reporting in 2010 that Vibram en-
listed ad agency to develop campaign “to promote the concept of ‘barefoot run-
ning’”); Vibram FiveFingers Brand Image Development, supra note 75 (describing how
Tomlinson’s marketing strategy included “branding” FiveFingers as an “alternative
to conventional footwear [that] delivers a number of health benefits including
improved balance and agility, a more natural walking motion, and less back pain”).
80. See Minimalist Footwear Company, Vibram FiveFingers® Debuts New Educational
Resources, BUSINESSWIRE (Feb. 8, 2012 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20120208005352/en/Minimalist-Footwear-Company-Vibram-FiveFin-
gers® -Debuts-Educational [hereinafter FiveFingers Debuts New Educational Resources]
(describing Vibram as “a leader in the barefoot running movement,” and “dedi-
cated to educating its consumers on the best practices for the minimalist fitness
revolution”); see also Brand Development, supra note 76 (explaining in 2011 that
Vibram was “striving to prove that its people love their product more, are commit-
ted to it and the community around it, and are innovating like crazy to increase
the product range ahead of the competition”).
81. See Baskin, supra note 7 (reporting that Vibram would begin print advertis-
ing campaign to promote microsite that “demonstrates how the human body is
built for running”).  Brian Gross, creative partner at the firm “Nail Communica-
tions,” explained that the initial FiveFingers print advertising campaign and corre-
sponding microsite “came out of the core belief behind barefoot running, which
is, ‘you are really all you need to run.’”  Vibram FiveFingers, The Making of Vibram
FiveFingers ‘You are the Technology’ Microsite, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=eFwgupPvzdg (discussing concepts behind “You are the
Technology” microsite); see also Vibram – Nail Communications, MEDIAPOST (Jan. 11,
2010 3:15 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/120285/vibram-
nail-communications.html?edition= (describing microsite as “dedicated to the con-
cept of barefoot running”).
82. FiveFingers Debuts New Educational Resources, supra note 80 (reporting that
Vibram “recently announced the launch of their new educational fitness resource
portal”).  According to a 2012 report, Vibram’s “educational fitness resource por-
tal” contained “new and exciting educational tools and information for consumers
looking to transition to barefoot fitness.” Id.  The report further explained,
“[f]ollowing a proprietary study to understand consumer motivation behind imple-
menting minimalist fitness practices, [Vibram] developed several resources,”
which were “the first of several in a series of new content with topics and insight in
to the revolutionary barefoot fitness category.” See id.
15
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tools and videos for consumers is a key way to inform those already
started, and for new users to transition.”83
III. THE VIBRAM LAWSUITS
In 2012, separate plaintiffs brought putative class action law-
suits against Vibram in the federal district courts for the District of
Massachusetts and the Northern District of Illinois.84  The nearly
identical complaints alleged that Vibram’s FiveFingers marketing
campaign was false or deceptive in violation of DTPAs under Flor-
ida, Massachusetts, and Illinois law.85
To state a claim under the respective statutes, a plaintiff must
establish that a deceptive act or practice by the defendants caused
an injury or loss suffered by the plaintiff.86  In other words, a plain-
tiff must establish three elements: (1) a false or deceptive act by the
defendant; (2) an injury to the plaintiff; and (3) a causal link be-
tween the defendant’s unlawful conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.87
Furthermore, in federal courts, claims alleging fraud must satisfy
the heightened pleading standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
83. Id.
84. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18; Complaint, De Falco, supra
note 18.  The Complaint in De Falco was initially filed in Illinois state court, see
Complaint, De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 2012L602 (Ill. 12th Cir. Ct. filed
Aug. 13, 2012), but was removed by Vibram to the Federal District Court for the
District of Northern Illinois under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See Notice
of Removal, De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C 7238 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2012).
85. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 72-80 (alleging un-
fair and deceptive conduct in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A § 2); id. paras.
81-89 (alleging violation of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla.
Stat. 501.201 et. seq.); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 67-80 (alleging
violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, Ill.
Compl. Stat. 505/2).
86. See Bezdek v. Vibram USA Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *1 (D.
Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (describing requirements for plaintiff to prevail on false ad-
vertising claims under Florida and Massachusetts law); De Falco v. Vibram USA,
Inc., No. 12 C 7238, 2013 WL 1122825, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2013) (describing
requirements for plaintiff to prevail on false advertising claims under Illinois law).
87. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *3 (quoting Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise
Line, Ltd., 919 N.E. 2d 165, 196 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009)) (describing elements re-
quired to establish claim under Massachusetts law); id. (quoting Smith v. Wm.
Wrigley Jr. Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2009)) (describing elements
required to establish claim under Florida law); De Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *6
(citing De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 922 N.E. 2d. 309, 314 (Ill. 2009)) (describing ele-
ments required to establish claim under Illinois law).  While certain states require
plaintiffs to establish additional elements to state a claim under their respective
DTPA (e.g., scienter), common elements under the Florida, Massachusetts, and
Illinois statutes are (1) a false or deceptive act, (2) injury, and (3) causation.
These are also the elements relevant to this Comment’s analysis.  Accordingly, in
analyzing private false advertising claims under state DTPAs, this Comment will
focus its discussion on these three elements.
16
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Procedure 9(b), which provides the following: “In alleging fraud or
mistake a party must state with particularity the circumstances consti-
tuting the fraud or mistake.”88
A. Allegations
In the Vibram Lawsuits, the plaintiffs averred that Vibram pro-
moted FiveFingers through an “extensive, comprehensive, and uni-
form nationwide marketing campaign.”89  Vibram’s marketing
efforts included in-store displays, promotional material on its web-
site, brochures accompanying FiveFingers, as well as various print
and online advertisements.90  Throughout its campaign, Vibram
made “uniform representations” that running in FiveFingers pro-
vides “numerous ‘health benefits’ that conventional running shoes
do not provide.”91  Such benefits include: “improv[ing] posture
and foot health, reduc[ing] risk of injury, strengthen[ing] muscles
in feet and lower legs, and promot[ing] spine alignment.”92
88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (emphasis added).
89. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 2; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 2 (same).  Because the plaintiffs’ allegations, the relevant legal
issues, and Vibram’s corresponding arguments in support of its motions to dismiss
were nearly identical in Bezdek and De Falco, this Comment discusses the two law-
suits collectively as the “Vibram Lawsuits.”  Unless otherwise noted, this Com-
ment’s discussion and analysis of the Vibram Lawsuits focuses on common aspects
of the two lawsuits.  If any aspects of Bezdek or De Falco diverge from generalized
statements in the text of this Comment, such distinctions will be highlighted in the
corresponding footnote.
90. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 22 (describing Five-
Fingers advertisements); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 23 (same).
91. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 20; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 21 (same).  The plaintiffs further asserted that Vibram’s “uni-
form” health benefit claims “are repeated and reinforced to such an extent . . . that
anyone purchasing the shoes would necessarily be exposed to them.”  Amended
Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 23; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para.
24 (same).The plaintiffs’ Complaints specifically connected FiveFingers with bare-
foot running, asserting that FiveFingers are “minimalist” shoes, which are intended
to mimic “barefoot” running. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para.
3; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).  Moreover, the plaintiffs’
allegations specified that Vibram’s health benefit claims refer to the health bene-
fits purportedly associated with barefoot running.  For example, the plaintiffs as-
serted that “[b]arefoot running has been touted as improving strength and
balance, while promoting a more natural running style.”  Amended Complaint,
Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 4; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
In turn, the plaintiffs alleged that Vibram marketed FiveFingers as providing “all
the health benefits of barefoot running combined” with Vibram’s patented sole.
Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 17; Complaint, De Falco, supra
note 18, para. 18 (same).
92. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
17
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According to the plaintiffs, Vibram’s “health benefit claims
[were] false and deceptive” because they were “not substantiated or
proven to exist through accepted scientific research.”93  The com-
plaints further alleged that there was “no reliable scientific proof
demonstrating FiveFingers actually provide” such health benefits.94
Nevertheless, Vibram “implicitly and explicitly” claimed their repre-
sentations were, in fact, supported by “reliable scientific proof.”95
In other words, Vibram’s “advertising campaign was false because it
misrepresented not only the health benefits of FiveFingers, but also
the extent to which such health benefits [had] been scientifically
corroborated.”96  In support of these assertions, the plaintiffs
pointed to statements by the American Podiatric Medical Associa-
tion, as well as various academic articles.97  According to the plain-
tiffs, these articles supported the propositions that (1) Vibram’s
“health-benefit representations [were] false and deceptive”;98 (2) at
93. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 3 (same).  More broadly, the plaintiffs also alleged that Five-
Fingers were “not proven to provide any of the health benefits beyond what con-
ventional running shoes provide.”  Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18,
para. 3; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
94. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3 (alleging that
“[u]nbeknownst to consumers, Defendants’ health benefit claims are false and de-
ceptive because FiveFingers are not proven to provide any of the health benefits
beyond what conventional running shoes provide,” and that “there are no well-
designed scientific studies that support Defendants’ health claims regarding Five-
Fingers”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
95. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 3 (same).  For example, the plaintiffs’ pointed to FiveFingers
brochures that stated: “[t]he benefits of running barefoot have long been sup-
ported by scientific research,” Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 26;
Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 27 (same), as well as in-store displays that
allegedly gave “the impression to reasonable consumers that there [was] scientific
evidence supporting the specific health-benefit representations,” Amended Com-
plaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 5; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 25
(same).
96. See Bezdek v. Vibram USA Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *1 (D.
Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (“Bezdek now claims, however, that defendants’ advertising
campaign was false and misleading because it misrepresented not only the health
benefits of FiveFingers, but also the extent to which such health benefits have been
scientifically corroborated.”); see also De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C 7238,
2013 WL 1122825, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2013) (noting that plaintiffs alleged
Vibram’s health benefit “representations are false” because Vibram “claimed that
there was scientific support for their assertions,” but “there is no adequate scien-
tific proof” to support such claims).
97. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 4, 45-47, 49 (citing,
e.g., APMA position statement on barefoot running, article published by APMA,
and article published by Professor of Kinesiology at Calgary University); Com-
plaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 4, 45-47, 49 (same).
98. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 41; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 41 (same).
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the time Vibram made such representations, there was “no scien-
tific support for the various representations of health benefits”;99
and (3) running in FiveFingers may, in fact, “increase injury risk as
compared to running in conventional running shoes.”100
As alleged, the named plaintiffs were consumers who pur-
chased FiveFingers after learning of the associated health benefits
through Vibram’s marketing campaign.101  Purportedly, the plain-
tiffs “would not have purchased . . . FiveFingers” but for Vibram’s
affirmative health benefit claims.102  Moreover, the complaints
broadly averred that reasonable consumers “would only purchase
FiveFingers . . . in reliance” on Vibram’s health claims.103  On that
basis, the plaintiffs contended that Vibram’s “false and misleading
ad campaign allowed them to reap millions of dollars of profit,”
because “[r]easonable consumers would not have paid the amounts
charged for FiveFingers, or would not have purchased [them] at all,
had they known . . . there [was] no scientific evidence supporting
[Vibram’s] major health benefit claims.”104  Thus, by consequence,
99. Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4 (noting that plaintiff alleges “that there is,
as yet, no scientific support for the various representations of health benefits made
by defendants”); see also Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 56 (alleg-
ing that “there is no scientific evidence supporting Defendants’ major health bene-
fit claims”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 56 (same).
100. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3 (“Indeed, run-
ning in FiveFingers may increase injury risk as compared to running in conven-
tional running shoes, and even when compared to barefoot running.”);
Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
101. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 11 (“In reliance on
the misleading health benefit claims about FiveFingers on Defendants’ website,
Plaintiff purchased a pair of FiveFingers.”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18,
para. 12 (“Plaintiff received Defendants’ deceptive and misleading statements in
print advertisements, through Defendants’ website, and Defendants’ in-store dis-
play.  In reliance on these deceptive and misleading health benefit claims about
FiveFingers, Plaintiff purchased three pairs of FiveFingers.”).
102. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 11 (“Had Plaintiff
known the truth about Defendants’ representations, she would not have purchased
the FiveFingers.”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 12 (same).
103. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 6; Complaint, De Falco,
supra note 18, para. 6 (same).  In support of this assertion, the Complaints allege
that barefoot running requires individuals to transition from a “heel-strike” tech-
nique (associated with conventional running shoes) to a “forefoot strike” tech-
nique, which can be “long and painful, and even lead to injuries.” See Amended
Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 5 (discussing process necessary to transition
to barefoot running technique); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 5 (same).
In that regard, the complaints infer that consumers “would only purchase FiveFin-
gers . . . in reliance on” Vibram’s health-benefits claims, because they require con-
sumers to change his or her running technique, which “may involve a long,
painful, and injury fraught regimen.”  Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18,
para. 6; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 6 (same).
104. Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 56; Complaint, De
Falco, supra note 18, para. 56 (same).  Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs,
19
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the plaintiffs ostensibly claimed to have purchased “product[s] that
[had] not been proven to perform as advertised,” and therefore,
were “worth less than [they] paid for [them].”105
B. Vibram’s Motions to Dismiss
In response, Vibram moved to dismiss the false advertising
claims against it, contending: (1) the plaintiffs failed to establish a
false or deceptive act by the defendants; (2) the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard for allegations of fraud;
and (3) the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury in fact.106  How-
ever, in both lawsuits, the respective courts denied Vibram’s mo-
tions to dismiss on similar grounds.107
Vibram utilized these health benefit claims “to charge prices for FiveFingers that
consumers readily paid, believing FiveFingers would confer upon them significant
advertised health benefits.”  Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3; cf.
Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 56 (alleging that “[d]efendants have
reaped millions of dollars in profits by leading consumers to believe that there is
reliable scientific data backing up their claims,” and that “[r]easonable consumers
would not have paid the amounts charged for FiveFingers . . . had they known”
that Vibram lacked such scientific support).
105. De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C 7238, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2013) (“In other words, Plaintiff alleges that Vibram’s misrepre-
sentations regarding health benefits caused him to purchase shoes that were worth
less than what he paid for them.”); see also Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note
18, para. 74 (alleging that “[p]laintiff . . . paid more for the falsely advertised prod-
uct [she] purchased than [it was] worth at the time of purchase”); Complaint, De
Falco, supra note 18, para. 56 (alleging that plaintiff “would not have paid the
amounts charged for FiveFingers” except for Vibram’s health benefit
representations).
106. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 5-8, Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-
10513 (D. Mass. June 4, 2012), 2012 WL 2117878 [hereinafter Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss, Bezdek] (providing arguments in support of Vibram’s motion to dis-
miss); Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Transfer. Or
Stay at 5-9, De Falco v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12 C 07238 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, De Falco] (same).
107. See Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *8-9
(D. Mass Feb. 20, 2013) (denying Vibram’s Motion to dismiss); De Falco, 2013 WL
1122825, at *7 (same).  For purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “all of the
[plaintiff’s] factual allegations” are accepted as true.  § 1216 Statement of the
Claim—Significance of “Claim for Relief”, 5 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216 (3d
ed.)  However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi-
cient factual matter, accepted as true to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  Thus, as the
Supreme Court has explained, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to satisfy the
pleading requirements to state a cause of action. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
20
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First, Vibram broadly asserted in both cases that the plaintiffs
failed to allege a false or deceptive act or practice.108  More specifi-
cally, Vibram contended that the allegations merely suggested that
the plaintiffs themselves disagreed with Vibram’s health benefit
claims, and that there was a dispute in the scientific community
concerning barefoot running’s health benefits.109  Both courts re-
jected this argument, however, on the basis that the plaintiffs did
not merely challenge the truth of Vibram’s product claims, but also
the existence of scientific support for such representations.110  Con-
sequently, the courts found that this argument was effectively a
challenge to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, which could not be
resolved through a motion on the pleadings.111  Second, the courts
similarly rejected Vibram’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to
plead, with particularity, the allegations of fraud.112  Both courts in-
terpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) as requiring factual
allegations as to the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “where,” and found
that the plaintiffs satisfied this standard by identifying Vibram as
the party that committed the fraud, the health benefit claims as the
108. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Bezdek, supra note 106, at 5-7 (arguing
that plaintiff failed to allege false or deceptive act or practice); Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss, De Falco, supra note 106, at 6-7 (same).
109. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4 (“Defendants also argue that the alle-
gations reflect merely a difference in opinion in the scientific community as to
barefoot running, and that Vibram has scientific support for its advertising.”); De
Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (“Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not estab-
lished that these statements are fraudulent; rather, that there is only a dispute in
the scientific community regarding the potential health benefits that may be con-
ferred by FiveFingers shoes.”); see also Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Bezdek, supra
note 106, at 6 (“The miscellaneous studies, positions, and undifferentiated com-
ments cherry-picked and cited by Plaintiff at most suggest a difference of opinion
respecting the efficacy of barefoot running.”); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, De
Falco, supra note 106, at 6-7 (contending that although “comments from various
articles, position papers, and public statements” cited by plaintiff “suggest there
may be a difference of opinion in the scientific community regarding some aspects
of barefoot running, they do not make out a claim for fraud”).
110. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *1 (explaining that complaint both al-
leges that Vibram’s health benefit claims were false and deceptive, and challenges
“the extent to which” its health benefit claims “have been scientifically corrobo-
rated”); De Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (explaining that “[c]omplaint alleges
‘how’ these statements are allegedly false by showing that there is no scientific
support for the statements”).
111. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4 (finding that Vibram raised “fact-based
argument” that could not be resolved on a motion on the pleadings); De Falco,
2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (concluding that Vibram’s arguments “[do] not identify a
pleading deficiency,” but rather raise “a defense to the merits” that cannot be ad-
dressed on a motion to dismiss).
112. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4-5 (holding that complaint satisfied
heightened pleading standard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)); De Falco, 2013 WL
1122825, at *7 (same).
21
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basis of the fraud, as well as the time and place they were exposed
to the fraud.113
Finally, Vibram argued that the plaintiffs failed to plead a cog-
nizable injury because, in essence, they received what they paid for,
and did not otherwise allege dissatisfaction with the FiveFingers or
that they received defective products.114  The courts held that Mas-
sachusetts, Illinois, and Florida law recognize “price premium” inju-
ries—essentially economic losses incurred by a consumer-plaintiff
who paid more for a product than its actual worth due to a defen-
dant’s misrepresentations—for lawsuits under the States’ respective
DTPAs.115  Furthermore, because the plaintiffs alleged that
Vibram’s misrepresentations allowed them to charge a higher price
for FiveFingers than they are actually worth, both courts found that
the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dis-
miss under this theory.116
IV. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF ADVERTISING
At both the state and federal level, advertising is predomi-
nantly regulated under consumer protection statutes that target
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.”117  In that re-
113. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4 (finding that complaint specifies “sev-
eral allegedly misleading statements,” lack of “scientific support” for such repre-
sentations, placement of such statements on Vibram website, and details regarding
“the particular statements that influenced [plaintiff] to purchase FiveFingers”); De
Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (finding complaint details “false statements” at issue,
that “Vibram made [the] false statements,” how statements were false based on
lack of “scientific support,” and the date and location plaintiff was exposed to such
statements).
114. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Bezdek, supra note 106, at 7-8 (arguing
that plaintiff failed to plead actionable injury); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, De
Falco, supra note 106, at 6-7 (arguing that plaintiff failed to allege injury in fact).
115. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4-8 (holding that Florida and Illinois
recognize “price premium” injury); De Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 n.8 (“Illinois
law allows a consumer who has been injured by fraud to recover under [its con-
sumer fraud act] for the loss of the benefit of the bargain.”); see also Bezdek, 2013
WL 639145, at *5 n.8 (explaining that “price premium” injury corresponds with
the “‘benefit of the bargain’ rule, whereby ‘plaintiff is entitled to recover the dif-
ference between the value of what he has received and the actual value of what he
would have received if the representations had been true” (citations omitted)).
116. Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *4 (holding that plaintiff adequately plead
price premium injury by alleging “economic loss, resulting from the fact that
she . . . paid more for the shoes than they were worth” by relying on alleged mis-
representations); De Falco, 2013 WL 1122825, at *7 (holding that plaintiff alleged
cognizable injury by pleading that “Vibram’s misrepresentations regarding health
benefits caused him to purchase shoes that were worth less than what he paid for
them”).
117. See Kevin M. Lemley, Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False Advertis-
ing Claims and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade Practices
Law: The Quest for Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace, 29 U. ARK.
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spect, state and federal regulatory schemes are similar insofar as
neither comprehensively defines the scope of unlawful advertising
practices.118  Nevertheless, with regard to enforcement, states di-
verge substantially from their federal counterpart.119  Most notably,
federal advertising regulations concerning consumer protection are
enforced exclusively by administrative agencies.120  Conversely, in
addition to government enforcement, “nearly every state provides
consumers with a private right of action” under its respective con-
sumer protection statute.121
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 283, 316-19 (2007) (explaining that advertising is regulated
under Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits “unfair or de-
ceptive practices in or affecting commerce,” and that states regulate advertising
under statutes modeled after FTC Act).  As one law review comment summarizes:
“There are three main sources of false advertising law in the United States.  Two of
these, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Lanham Act, are found in fed-
eral statutes.  The remaining is a composite of state consumer fraud statutes gener-
ally referred to as Little FTC Acts.”  Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least
Resistance: Re-Examining the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising,
72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 654 (2005) (describing elements, defenses to liability, and
examples of false advertising claims against commercial manufacturers under
three legal theories).  The Lanham Act allows private parties to bring false advertis-
ing claims “to protect commercial interests that have been harmed by a competi-
tor’s false advertising” and to protect their commercial reputation and competitive
business advantage. See Marie K. Pesando, False, Defamatory, Obscene, or Otherwise
Objectionable Advertising—Under Lanham Act, 3 AM. JUR. 2D ADVERTISING § 4 (2015)
(describing Lanham Act).  “The purpose of the Lanham Act’s prohibition against
misleading advertising . . . is to protect persons engaged in commerce . . . against
unfair competition.” Id. (citing POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola, 134 S. Ct. 2228
(2014)).  As such, the Lanham Act only governs advertising with respect to compe-
tition between businesses. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2234 (holding that
Lanham Act causes of action for misleading advertising are available to “competi-
tors, not consumers”).  Thus, as it pertains to consumers, advertising is regulated
under the FTC Act and analogous state consumer protection acts. See Lemley,
supra, at 316-19 (describing false advertising regulation under FTC Act and analo-
gous state law statutes).
118. See Lemley, supra note 117, at 319 (explaining that state DTPAs, like
their “federal counterpart . . . do not define what constitutes a deceptive trade
practice”).
119. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Con-
sumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005) (discussing significant differ-
ences between enforcement of advertising regulations under state and federal
law).
120. See id. (explaining that FTC Act “provides for enforcement only by [gov-
ernment] agencies”).
121. Id.
23
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A. Historical Foundations of False Advertising Law
1. Consumer Protection and the Common Law
Consumer protection legislation is largely a product of the
twentieth century.122  However, the foundational principles of false
advertising law are rooted in the common law, dating back to the
year 1201.123  Historically, common law tort and contract actions
were available to consumers who were harmed by deceptive busi-
ness practices.124  By the early twentieth century, legislatures per-
ceived the inadequacy of common law remedies in certain
situations.125  On that basis, throughout the twentieth century, state
and federal legislatures developed broad regulatory schemes to pro-
tect consumers by combating unfair and deceptive business
practices.126
2. The Development of Federal Regulation and Enforcement
In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTC Act”) to address its concerns regarding the escalating size
and power of businesses, as well as the inadequacy of common law
122. See id. at 7 (explaining that legislatures began enacting consumer protec-
tion laws by beginning of twentieth century).
123. See id. at 5 (describing how state and federal consumer protection laws
“have their origin in common law fraud and misrepresentation claims”).  Specifi-
cally, Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman explain that “[t]he present tort of
misrepresentation evolved from the ‘Writ of Deceit,’ which dates back to the year
1201.” See id. at 6 (citing DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 105,
at 727 (5th ed. 1984)).
124. See id. at 6-7 (discussing historical development of common law tort ac-
tions regarding deceptive business practices).
125. See id. at 7 (recounting that “inadequacy of common law tools with which
a consumer could address false advertising and deceitful commercial schemes in
some circumstances” led Congress to pass consumer protection legislation in early
twentieth century); see also LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1A CALLMAN ON UN-
FAIR COM., TR. & MONO. § 5:2 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter CALLMAN] (“Before fed-
eral legislation intervened, the courts had not evolved a concept of unfair
competition consistent with the understanding of the honest tradesman.”); Jeff
Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC
Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 439 (1991) (“The common law rules appli-
cable to deceptive trade—founded principally on the law of fraud and contract—
are not particularly good vehicles for consumers.”).
126. See sources cited infra notes 127-148 and accompanying text (discussing
development of state and federal consumer protection legislation with focus on
false advertising regulation).  Today, the common law still provides causes of ac-
tion by which consumers can obtain remedies for harm caused by unfair or decep-
tive business practices; additionally, however, the federal government, all fifty
states, and the District of Columbia have enacted broad legislation to specifically
address such practices. See CALLMAN, supra note 125, at § 5:1 (“False advertising
may be litigated pursuant to the common law and numerous federal or state
statutes.”).
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tools “with which a consumer could address false advertising and
deceitful commercial schemes.”127  Most notably, the FTC Act estab-
lished the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and empowered it
to regulate “unfair methods of competition.”128
In 1931, the United States Supreme Court held that the FTC
lacked authority under its enabling statute to regulate commercial
activities, such as advertising, that had no effect on competition be-
tween businesses.129  In light of that holding, Congress amended
the FTC Act in 1938 to expand “the FTC’s jurisdiction by granting
it power to regulate ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce’ in addition to ‘unfair methods of competition in com-
merce.’”130  In that respect, the 1938 Amendment provided the
contemporary foundation for federal regulation of advertising.131
127. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 7-8 (discussing purpose of FTC
Act).  Congress sought to promote fair business practices by addressing both mo-
nopolistic behavior and consumer protection concerns. See id.  Regarding con-
sumer protection, in the words of one federal district court, the FTC Act “was
intended to protect not just the sophisticated, but rather that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general
impressions.”  Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp. 950, 957 (D.D.C. 1972) (ci-
tations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 7-8 (describing FTC Act of
1914).
129. See id. at 8 (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 654 (1931)).  In
FTC v. Raladam Co., the FTC alleged that a defendant drug manufacturer violated
the FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair methods of competition in interstate
commerce.” See 283 U.S. at 644-45.  In support of these charges, the FTC asserted
that the manufacturer’s advertisements were “calculated to mislead and deceive
the purchasing public” that its drugs were “safe, effective, dependable, and without
danger of harmful results,” when in fact, the drugs could be harmful to the health
of consumers. See id. at 645.  The Supreme Court held that the FTC lacked juris-
diction over this matter, concluding that the statutory term “competition” con-
noted the existence of “present or potential competitors.” See id. at 649-54.  Thus,
the Court held that under the original version of the FTC Act, the FTC lacked
authority to regulate business practices that were merely unfair to consumers
rather than competitors. See id. (holding that “unfair methods must be such as
injuriously affect . . . business” of competitors); see also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro.,
Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934) (holding that the FTC lacked authority under 1914
act to regulate trade practices aimed at encouraging gambling among children,
but noting that such practices were indisputably “unfair” and “contrary to public
policy”).
130. United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that 1938 Amendments were “aimed primarily at broadening the FTC’s
jurisdiction”); see also Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 8 (describing how
Congress amended FTC Act in 1938 to provide FTC broad authority to “prohibit
unfair or deceptive acts”).
131. See CORP. COUNSEL’S ANTITRUST DESKBOOK § 13:1 (William M. Hannay
ed., 2014-15 ed. 2014) (stating that FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices . . . . refers to the FTC’s consumer protection authority”).
25
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The FTC Act’s legislative history provides valuable evidence of
Congress’ outlook on the regulation of advertising.132  When Con-
gress debated the 1914 Act, several members were apprehensive
about including a blanket prohibition of “unfair” practices without
defining the term.133  However, as one scholarly article recounts,
“[o]ne significant factor in calming the concerns of Congress” was
that “the power to determine unfair practices” would be limited to
the FTC, a body of nonpartisan experts, who would “be able to de-
termine justly whether [a] practice is contrary to good morals or
not.”134  Moreover, “[a]n additional factor ameliorating Congress’s
concern at the time of the 1938 expansion of the act to include
consumer protection was that the FTC’s power was ‘merely prevent-
ative and cooperative rather than penal.’”135
Undoubtedly, a defining characteristic of federal advertising
regulation is exclusive enforcement by administrative agencies.136
In 1914, Congress debated, and subsequently rejected, a proposal
to provide a private right of action under the FTC Act because sev-
eral members believed that private enforcement would be incom-
patible with the FTC Act’s remedial purpose.137  One senator, for
example, expressed that private actions could be retroactive and
punitive in light of the ambiguous scope of “unfair practices.”138
132. See infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text (discussing FTC Act’s leg-
islative history).
133. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 11 (citing 51 CONG. REC.
11,084-109, 11,112-16 (1914)) (recounting that many members of Congress were
concerned that “such a broad provision . . . would allow for arbitrary and abusive
enforcement”).
134. Id. (citing 51 CONG. REC. 11,108-09 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newl-
ands)) (discussing safeguards of vesting FTC with sole power to enforce FTC Act,
and reasons Congress declined to provide private right of action under FTC Act).
135. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 74-2, at 1 (1936)) (describing congressional de-
bates surrounding the 1938 amendment to FTC Act).
136. See id. at 11-15 (discussing “why Congress placed enforcement solely with
the government and not with private lawyers under the FTC Act”); cf. Lemley,
supra note 117, at 320 (“The key difference between the FTC Act and little FTC
acts is that enforcement of little FTC acts is free from the restraints imposed on the
FTC Act.”).
137. See generally Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 12-15 (evaluating
why Congress considered but rejected proposal to provide private right of action
under FTC Act).
138. Senator Porter McCumber urged that “if no man on earth can know
whether he is obeying the law and tells him that he is disobeying the law, does not
the Senator think that mulcting him in treble damages is a little bit harsh?” Id. at
13 (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 13,114 (1914) (statement of Sen. McCumber)).  In that
connection, Senator John Sharp Williams noted that the provision “might be retro-
active in a rather oppressive manner.” Id. at 13 n.51 (quoting 51 CONG. REC.
13,118 (1914) (statement of Sen. Williams)).  Some members further suggested
that it was unnecessary to provide a private action under the FTC because “citizens
injured by an unfair act could already exercise their rights at common law to bring
26
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Other members of Congress similarly “thought [that] opening two
forums for deciding violations under the Act, the [FTC] and fed-
eral courts, could lead to confusion and conflict.”139  Perhaps most
notably, however, “Congress feared [that] courts might allow con-
sumers to go directly to court without prior FTC action, which
would have allowed judges rather than commissioners to decide
whether conduct was fair.”140
3. “Little-FTC Acts”: The Development of State Regulation and
Enforcement
The contemporary brand of state consumer protection laws
can be traced to the 1960s and 70s—”a period when sweeping con-
sumer rights laws were in vogue.”141  During that period, many
states enacted uniform consumer protection acts that were
modeled after the FTC Act.142  Today, every state and the District of
Columbia have adopted such laws, which are commonly referred to
as “little-FTC Acts.”143
an action for recovery.” Id. at 14 (citing CONG. REC. 11,112 (1914) (statement of
Sen. Newlands); CONG. REC. 13,151 (1914) (statement of Sen. Cummins)).
139. Id. at 13 (citing CONG. REC. 13,120 (1914) (statements of Sens. Stone
and Reed)).
140. Id. (citing CONG. REC. 13,114-15 (colloquy between Sens. McCumber and
Clapp); CONG. REC. 13,115 (1914) (colloquy between Sens. Brandegee and
Clapp)).  Furthermore, as suggested by Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman,
some members of Congress were concerned that a private right of action would
give rise to “a certain class of lawyers” who would attempt to make careers of “hunt-
ing up and working up” lawsuits under the broad and ambiguous scope of “unfair
conduct.” Id. at 14 (quoting CONG. REC. 13,120 (1914) (statement of Sen. Stone)).
141. Id. at 15; see also Lemley, supra note 117, at 319 (asserting that many
states adopted “deceptive trade practices law[s] based on the FTC Act . . . . during
the ‘heyday of consumerism’ in the 1960s and 1970s”).  Like Congress, individual
states also began to adopt legislation targeting false advertising and other decep-
tive business practices in the early twentieth century. See Albert Norman Shelden
& Stephen Gardner, A Truncated Overview of State Consumer Protection Laws, C888
ALI-ABA 375, 378 (1994) (describing early state consumer protection laws).  How-
ever, these early statutes generally proved difficult to enforce, and “did not have
the deterrent effect anticipated.” Id.
142. See id. at 380-84 (describing nature of consumer protection laws that
states began enacting in 1960s); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Drug Advertising
Claims: Preemption’s New Frontier, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1633 (2008) (“Con-
sumer fraud statutes have their origin in common law fraud and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.”).
143. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 16  (“All fifty states and the
District of Columbia now have adopted little-FTC Acts.” (citing Jack E. Karns, State
Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC Acts” Should Federal Standards
Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 373-74 n.2 (1990)).
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At their inception, “[t]he federal and state laws were meant to
complement each other.”144  Indeed, during the “‘heyday of con-
sumerism,’ the FTC urged states to adopt their own little-FTC Acts
as a way of combining resources to target unfair and deceptive prac-
tices at both the local and national levels.”145  While the intricacies
of these statutes vary from state to state, “each broadly prohibits
unfair or deceptive acts, as does the [FTC] Act.”146  Nevertheless,
regulation and enforcement under little-FTC acts fundamentally
differs from the FTC Act insofar as little-FTC Acts provide for both
private and administrative enforcement.147  Furthermore, in con-
trast to the FTC Act’s “preventative and cooperative” policy objec-
tives, many little-FTC acts incorporate retroactive and punitive
components by allowing private litigants to recover statutory dam-
ages and attorneys’ fees.148
B. Contemporary Sources of False Advertising Laws: Regulation
and Enforcement under the FTC Act and
“Little FTC Acts”
1. FTC Enforcement Authority Under the FTC Act
Under the FTC Act, it is unlawful for “any person, partnership,
or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated,” any
false, deceptive, or unfair advertisements.149  Section 5 of the FTC
Act further provides the FTC with a wide range of regulatory and
enforcement powers in connection with the statute’s substantive
provisions.150  The FTC, for example, may promulgate regulations
144. Id.; see also Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at 390 (stating that “regu-
lation of business activity by the FTC and the states has a history of co-existence”).
145. Schwartz & Silverman, supra 119, at 16 (describing intended roles for
FTC Act and corresponding state laws).
146. Id. at 15 (describing that while state DTPAs “take various forms, each
broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts, as does the FTC[ ] Act”); see generally
Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at 380-84 (describing different model con-
sumer protection statutes adopted by states).
147. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 15-16 (contending that “cru-
cial difference” between FTC Act and little FTC Acts is that “almost all state [acts]
provide consumers with a private right of action to enforce their provisions”).
148. See id. at 22-27 (discussing available remedies and availability of attor-
neys’ fees and costs under state DTPAs).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 52 (defining “false, deceptive, or unfair advertis[ing]” as
unfair or deceptive act or practice).  Generally, the FTC Act’s prohibition of “de-
ceptive acts or practices” has been interpreted as referring to “the FTC’s consumer
protection activities regarding advertising.” See CORP. COUNSEL’S ANTITRUST
DESKBOOK, supra note 131, § 13:1 (stating that “unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices” refers to FTC’s consumer protection authority).
150. See infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (discussing FTC’s regula-
tory and enforcement powers under Section 5 of FTC Act).
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and policies interpreting the FTC Act’s prohibition on false, decep-
tive, or unfair advertising.151  Additionally, the FTC may prohibit
specific acts or practices, and prescribe general standards or
requirements.152
With respect to its enforcement authority, the FTC may con-
duct internal investigations and hold administrative hearings con-
cerning apparent instances of unlawful advertising.153  Moreover,
the Commission can enforce advertising regulations through direct
actions in federal district court, through which it may prosecute vio-
lations, or seek preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining or-
ders upon belief that a party “is engaged in, or is about to engage
in” unlawful conduct.154  To establish unlawful advertising prac-
tices, the FTC is required to demonstrate (1) “probable not possi-
ble, deception (‘likely to mislead,’ not ‘tendency and capacity’ to
mislead)”; (2) “potential deception of ‘consumers acting reasonably
in the circumstances,’ not just any consumers”; and (3) “deceptions
that are likely to cause injury to reasonable relying consumers.”155
2. Private Enforcement Authority Under State Deceptive Trade Practices
Acts
Under little-FTC Acts, false or deceptive advertising is generally
encompassed under a broad prohibition of unfair and deceptive
trade practices.156  While “[m]ost of the state laws” enumerate spe-
151. See Mandelkehr, supra note 24, at 312 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)) (describ-
ing FTC authority to interpret statutory provisions on false and deceptive
advertising).
152. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) (explaining that FTC may exercise its
“Section 5 powers” to “prohibit advertisements that are likely to deceive consum-
ers”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57a(1)(A)-(B) (dictating FTC’s rulemaking authority and
procedures); § 54 (prescribing penalties for violations of FTC Act’s false advertis-
ing provision, § 52).
153. See Mandelkehr, supra note 24, at 312-13 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c))
(outlining FTC internal process for bringing complaint against advertiser and con-
ducting administrative hearing); see also § 57a(c) (dictating FTC’s informal hear-
ing procedure).
154. See Mandelkehr, supra note 24, at 313 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)-(b))
(describing FTC’s proscribed authority and procedural requirement for bringing
lawsuits in federal court to enforce FTC Act).
155. Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986); accord
F.T.C. v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988);
F.T.C. v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); F.T.C. v. Freecom
Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005).  The federal courts have
adopted this standard for analyzing FTC allegations of “deceptive trade practices,”
which is “essentially . . . a cost-benefit analysis” known as the “reasonable consumer
test.” See Lemley, supra note 117, at 318.
156. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 15 (explaining that state
consumer protection laws generally prohibit broad scope of “unfair or deceptive
29
Calo: Deceptive Advertising or Evolving Science? How "Barefoot Running"
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 111 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 111 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 30 27-JUL-15 10:27
558 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 529
cific unlawful practices, these lists are typically non-exhaustive.157
Accordingly, many little-FTC Acts empower the state attorney gen-
eral to promulgate interpretive guidelines and administrative rules,
conduct investigations, and prosecute unlawful conduct.158  How-
ever, the “crucial difference” between the FTC Act and little-FTC
Acts “is that almost all [little-FTC Acts] provide consumers with a
private right of action to enforce their provisions.”159
A further distinction is that, in contrast with the FTC Act’s re-
medial policy objectives, many states allow private plaintiffs to re-
cover civil penalties in the forum of double or treble damages.160
Likewise, to incentivize private attorneys to bring consumer claims,
some states have imposed minimum damages awards and allow pre-
vailing consumers to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.161  The ele-
ments necessary to bring private lawsuits under little-FTC Acts vary
acts”); see also Lemley, supra note 117, 316-21 (discussing nature of state deceptive
practices acts with regard to false advertising).
157. Lemley, supra note 117, at 319.
158. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 16 (“Most state laws include
a provision directing state regulators to look to the FTC for guidance in terms of
substantive law, encouraging state regulators to emphasize enforcement and reme-
dies, rather than focus on policymaking.”); Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at
386-91 (surveying government enforcement authority and procedures under state
DTPAs); see also Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV.
657, 658 (1985) (“Virtually everyone agrees that deceptive advertising is bad.  Few,
however, agree about how best to tell whether an advertisement is deceptive.”).
159. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 16; see generally Henry N. Butler
& Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 163 (2011) (discussing studies that “suggest private litigation under Little-
FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission”).  For an illustra-
tion of the practical distinctions between government enforcement under the FTC
Act and private enforcement under state DTPAs, compare Sovern, supra note 125,
at 440-45 (describing practical constraints on FTC enforcement), with Lemley,
supra note 117, at 316-27 (discussing “relationship of false advertising law and state
deceptive trade practices laws”), and Schwartz & Silverman, supra 119, at 15-45
(discussing scope and abuse of private enforcement authority under state DTPAs).
160. See Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at 392 (describing how
“[a]pproximately 20 states provide for double or treble damages”); see also
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 68-69 (contending that unlike FTC en-
forcement which is remedial and injunctive, “[p]rivate lawsuits are retrospective
and often impose damages in excess of actual damages”).
161. See Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at 392 (describing that some
state DTPAs “provide that the prevailing consumer will recover either the actual
damages or a minimum damage award, whichever is greater”); see also Lemley,
supra note 117, at 320 (stating that enhanced damages provide incentives for plain-
tiffs’ attorneys to bring lawsuits under state DTPAs); Shelden & Gardner, supra
note 141, at 391 (noting how increasing number of state DTPAs provide  for  pre-
vailing consumers to recover attorney’s fees and costs, but these statutes vary inso-
far as some “make it mandatory . . . while others make it discretionary”).
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from state to state.162  However, the requirements are generally
more lenient than the analogous cause of action for common law
fraud.163  The practical consequence of such variations is the extent
to which little-FTC Acts provide for private enforcement as opposed
to private remedies.164
V. EVOLVING THEORIES FOR EVOLVING MATTERS: WHY THE CLAIMS
AGAINST VIBRAM SHOULD FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW
The false advertising claims against Vibram were premised on
allegations that Vibram “misrepresented not only the health bene-
fits of FiveFingers, but also the extent to which such health benefits
[had] been scientifically corroborated.”165  Moreover, the health
claims at issue represented novel and developing areas of research
in the scientific community.166  In that regard, these lawsuits raise a
number of unique legal questions – most notably concerning the
extent to which manufacturers may be held liable for advertising
162. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 17-21 (analyzing distinctions
in elements required to bring private claims under state DTPAs).  Noteworthy dis-
tinctions include the need to show reliance, the requisite intent by the defendant,
and the need (or the extent of a private plaintiff’s obligation) to show injury in fact
and damages. See id. (enumerating distinctions).  In some states, the requisite ele-
ments are expressly prescribed by statute, while in others, the elements have been
established by judicial interpretation of the statutes. See id. at 17 (discussing source
of requisite elements for private causes of action under state DTPAs).
163. See Sharkey, supra note 142, at 1633 (“Consumer protection statutes
often relax one or more of the common law fraud elements, for example, by liber-
alizing standing requirements, or by relieving plaintiffs of the burden of demon-
strating causation or injury.”).
164. See Shelden & Gardner, supra note 141, at 391 (explaining that some
state DTPAs “allow actions under the theory of ‘private attorney general’”);
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 24 (contending that states with enhanced
damages provisions view them “as a way to encourage private enforcement of their
[DTPAs] by providing an economic incentive to sue in cases where actual damages
may be very small”).  Schwartz and Silverman explain that the majority of states “do
not require a showing of reliance” by private plaintiffs, and contend that courts in
such states utilize a standard similar to the “reasonable consumer test” employed
by federal courts in evaluating FTC allegations of “deceptive trade practices” – an
assessment of “whether the act has the tendency or capacity to mislead consumers,
regardless of whether the plaintiff actually and reasonably relied on the misrepre-
sentation.” Id. at 19; see supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing “rea-
sonable consumer test”).
165. See Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *1.
For a description of the allegations against Vibram, see supra notes 89-105 and
accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text (describing scientific com-
munity’s research and evaluation of barefoot running).
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claims where the falsity or deceptiveness of such claims is the sub-
ject of an evolving debate in the scientific community.167
A number of recent decisions by federal courts have revealed
emerging legal trends that may provide innovative strategies for de-
fending false advertising claims under similar circumstances.168
Specifically, these decisions indicate that: (1) private plaintiffs can-
not sustain false advertising actions based on allegations that a de-
fendant’s product claims are unsubstantiated;169 and (2) matters
concerning ongoing debates in the scientific community cannot
form the basis of false advertising actions.170  These propositions
provide advantageous defense strategies, allowing defendants to ef-
ficiently challenge the legal sufficiency of false advertising claims at
the early stages of litigation.171  This section uses the Vibram law-
suits as a platform for providing the legal background of these theo-
ries, and demonstrating how they can be utilized as powerful
defense tools in future cases.172
A. The Claims Against Vibram Should Fail as a Matter of Law
Because Private Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring Unsubstantiated
Advertising Claims, and the Allegations Fail to Demonstrate That
Vibram’s Health Benefit Claims Were False or Deceptive
1. Private Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring Unsubstantiated
Advertising Claims under State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts
In recent years, numerous federal courts applying state DTPAs
have, without controversy, tendered the proposition that adminis-
trative agencies “and not private plaintiffs retain exclusive authority
to prosecute claims of unsubstantiation.”173  In a series of “decisions
167. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (describing unique legal
issues pertaining to matters of scientific debate).
168. See infra notes 173-307 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing
these legal theories).
169. See infra notes 173-242 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing
“unsubstantiated advertising” legal theory).
170. See infra notes 243-307 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing
“matters of scientific debate” legal theory).
171. For a hypothetical application of these legal theories, see infra notes 193-
242 and accompanying text (unsubstantiated advertising), and 280-207 and accom-
panying text (matters of scientific debate).
172. See infra notes 173-307 and accompanying text.
173. See Dana Rosenfeld & Daniel Blynn, The ‘Prior Substantiation’ Doctrine: An
Important Check On the Piggyback Class Action, 26 ANTITRUST 68, 68-69 (Fall 2011).
(“Over the past few years, courts have held that the FTC and FDA—and not private
plaintiffs—retain exclusive authority to prosecute claims of unsubstantiation”);
William C. MacLeod & Daniel S. Blynn, Substantiation in the Courts: Is Unsubstanti-
ated Advertising Deceptive?, KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN (Apr. 10, 2013), at 1, http://
www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1708/_res/id=Files/index=0/04-
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in a number of key jurisdictions,” these courts have dismissed false
advertising claims (or granted summary judgment to the defen-
dant) that were premised on allegations that the defendant adver-
tised unsubstantiated product claims.174  Underlying each holding
is the cohesive reasoning that state DTPAs do not recognize an “un-
substantiated advertising” theory of liability in connection with pri-
vate lawsuits.175
“The modern doctrine of advertising substantiation is based on
the theory that unsubstantiated advertising is deceptive under Sec-
tion 5 of the [FTC] Act.”176  On that basis, the FTC exercises its
regulatory authority to investigate claims it believes are unsubstanti-
ated.177  Likewise, pursuant to its Section 5 authority, the FTC es-
tablished its “Advertising Substantiation Program” in 1971, through
which the FTC may require advertisers to “submit on FTC demand
tests, studies, or other data that purport to substantiate advertised
3%20(2).pdf (explaining how theory that “unsubstantiated advertising is deceptive
under Section 5 of the [FTC Act] . . . . is running into resistance in courts applying
state counterparts of Section 5”).
174. See Kenneth A. Plevan, Gregory S. Bailey & Limor Robinson, Consumer
Fraud Class Actions: What Does a Plaintiff Need To Plead and Prove to Challenge ‘Here’s
Proof’ Claims?, 41 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., No. 42 (Oct. 28, 2013) (“It is
now generally well-accepted, based on decisions in a number of key jurisdictions,
that a private party challenging advertising under state consumer protection/fraud
statutes does not state a legally sufficient cause of action by simply alleging that the
challenged advertising lacks proper substantiation.”); e.g., Fraker v. Bayer Corp.,
No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009); Franulovic v. Coca Cola
Co., 390 Fed. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2010); Pelkey v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare,
Civ. No. 10-61853, 2011 WL 677424 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011); Chavez v. Nestle
USA, Inc., No. 09-9192, 2011 WL 2150128 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2011); Precision IBC,
Inc. v. PCM Capital, LLC, No. 10-0682, 2011 WL 2728467 (S.D. Ala. July 12, 2011);
Stanley v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. 11-862, 2012 WL 1132920 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3,
2012); Scheuerman v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition, Inc., Nos. 10-3684, 10-5628,
2012 WL 2916827 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012); Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-
727, 2012 WL 5382218 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012); Gaul v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC,
No. 12-5110, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Hughes v. Ester C
Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-1935, 2013
WL 1498965 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013); McCray v. The Elations Co., No. EDCV 13-
0242 JGB (OPx), 2013 WL 6403073, at * (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2013); Greifenstein v.
Estee Lauder Corp., No. 12-cv-09235, 2013 WL 3874073 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2013).
175. See MacLeod & Blynn, supra note 173, at 1 (“Underlying each decision is
a common theme: plaintiffs cannot simply argue that a defendant’s advertising
claims are unsubstantiated and, thus, necessarily false under state law.”).
176. Id. at 2.
177. See Mandelkehr, supra note 24, at 300 (citing In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23,
26 (1972)) (“The FTC has the regulatory authority to prohibit advertisers from
making false or deceptive claims, including claims that are not properly substanti-
ated by scientific evidence.”); supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text (describ-
ing FTC’s regulatory and enforcement authority).
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claims regarding a product’s safety, performance, efficacy, quality,
or comparative price.”178
The FTC’s 1972 decision in In re Pfizer, Inc.179 established the
prevailing requirement that advertisers must possess a “reasonable
basis for affirmative product claims” in advertisements.180  The FTC
subsequently specified that affirmative product claims will violate
the FTC Act if the advertiser lacks “prior substantiation,” in other
words, “a reasonable basis for [such] claims before they are dissemi-
nated.”181  In general, the FTC has declined to promulgate bright-
line standards for complying with the “prior substantiation” re-
quirement.182  However, when advertisements contain express state-
ments “regarding the amount of support the advertiser has for the
product claim . . . (e.g., ‘tests prove’, ‘doctors recommend’, and
‘studies show’), the [FTC] expects the firm to have at least the ad-
vertised level of substantiation.”183  Similarly, “claims relating to
178. See Dorothy Cohen, The FTC’s Advertising Substantiation Program, J. MAR-
KETING, Winter 1980, at 26, 26 (discussing origins and features of FTC advertising
substantiation program, and describing it as “designed to ‘assist consumers to
make rational choices’”); Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement Regarding
Advertising Substantiation Program, FTC, 49 FR 30999-03, at *31000 (Aug. 2,
1984), appended to, In re Thomson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984), aff’d,
791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987) [hereinafter FTC
Policy Statement] (describing enforcement procedures under advertising substan-
tiation program).
179. 81 F.T.C. 23, 1972 WL 127465 (1972).
180. See Pfizer, 1972 WL 127465, at *1 (“Opinion of the Commission resolves
the general issue that the failure to possess a reasonable basis for affirmative prod-
uct claims constitutes an unfair practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.”); see also Randal Shaheen & Amy Ralph Mudge, Has the FTC Changed the
Game on Advertising Substantiation?, 25 ANTITRUST 65, 65-66 (Fall, 2010) (explaining
that Pfizer established “baseline requirements for substantiation”).
181. See FTC Policy Statement, supra note 178, at *31000 (emphasis added)
(describing prior substantiation requirement); see also In re Pom Wonderful, LLC,
F.T.C., No. 9344, 2013 WL 268926 (Jan. 16, 2013) (reaffirming reasonable basis
standard).
182. See Shaheen & Mudge, supra note 180, at 65 (explaining that FTC Policy
Statement “made clear” that reasonable basis standard “was intended to be quite
flexible”).  The FTC Policy Statement “suggested that the FTC would essentially
conduct a cost/benefit analysis to determine what constituted required substantia-
tion.” Id.  Specifically, the FTC explained that its “determination of what consti-
tutes a reasonable basis depends . . . on a number of factors relevant to the benefits
and costs of substantiating a particular claim.”  FTC Policy Statement, supra note
178, at *31000 (describing requisite standards for prior substantiation).  “These
factors include: the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false claim,
the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim,
and the amount of substantiation experts in the field believe is reasonable.” Id.
183. FTC Policy Statement, supra note 178, at *31000 (describing require-
ments for “express” substantiation claims).
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health and safety” must be substantiated by “competent and reliable
scientific evidence.”184
By contrast, a line of recent federal court decisions has made
abundantly clear that, unlike the FTC, private plaintiffs lack author-
ity to bring false advertising claims based on a lack of substantiation
theory of liability.185  These decisions do not suggest that an unsub-
stantiated product claim cannot be false or deceptive under state
law, but rather that private plaintiffs may not rely on allegations
that a defendant’s advertising claims are unsubstantiated.186  In-
stead, a plaintiff must affirmatively plead and prove that such claims
are demonstratively false or deceptive, and not merely
unsubstantiated.187
These federal courts have similarly held that a private plaintiff
may not establish falsity or deception by “piggybacking” on FTC ac-
tions for unsubstantiated advertising.188  In that regard, the under-
184. See Shaheen & Mudge, supra note 180, at 66 (citing In re Novartis Corp.,
127 F.T.C. 580, 580 (1999)) (describing FTC’s substantiation requirements for
health and safety claims).
185. See Rosenfeld & Blynn, supra note 173, at 68 (discussing line of recent
cases finding private plaintiffs lack authority to bring unsubstantiated advertising
claims); e.g., Franulovic v. Coca Cola Co., 390 Fed. App’x 125, 128 (3rd Cir. 2010)
(concluding that “[n]o New Jersey or Third Circuit decision has applied the prior
substantiation theory to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,” and that “the Dis-
trict Court correctly held that a New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claim cannot be
premised on a prior substantiation theory of liability”); Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc.,
Civ. No. 09-9192, 2011 WL 2150128, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (“In short, the
government, representing the Federal Trade Commission, can sue an advertiser
for making unsubstantiated advertising claims; a private plaintiff cannot.” (cita-
tions omitted)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 511 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2013).
For a detailed list of similar holdings, see cases cited supra note 174.
186. See, e.g., Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (noting that “[m]erely because a fact is unsupported by clinical tests does not
make it untrue” (emphasis added) (quoting Gredell v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 854 N.E.
2d. 752, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006))).
187. See id. at 456-57 (“ [B]ecause there is no remedy for ‘unsubstantiated
advertising,’ private litigants are limited to claims for false or misleading advertis-
ing, which require supporting factual bases for such allegations.”).  As one court
explained, a plaintiff may not sustain false advertising claims based on allegations
that an advertising claim is unsubstantiated, but instead must plead sufficient facts
to “lend ‘facial plausibility’” to allegations that an advertising claim is, in fact, false
or misleading. See Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-727, 2012 WL 5382218, at
*3, *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (describing plaintiff’s burden in pleading false ad-
vertising claim).
188. See, e.g., Fracker v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687, at *8
(holding that plaintiff cannot “successfully allege a claim for false advertising”
without providing factual basis that advertisement is false or deceptive “apart from
what is alleged in or inferred by” consent decree with the FTC or FTC Order); see
also Rosenfeld & Blynn, supra note 173, at 69 (contending that “unifying basis” for
recent line of cases dismissing false advertising claims is “courts’ refusal to apply
the ‘prior substantiation doctrine’ in private class actions”).
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lying rationale is that the FTC exercises its investigative and
remedial enforcement powers in prosecuting unsubstantiated ad-
vertising.189  Private litigants, conversely, have no authority to re-
quire advertisers to provide substantiation or to bring subsequent
lack of substantiation claims.190  To the contrary, private plaintiffs
alone bear the burden of independently establishing that the adver-
tisement is demonstrably false or deceptive.191  Accordingly, these
courts have reasoned that allowing private plaintiffs to bring unsub-
stantiated advertising claims “would inappropriately shift the bur-
den from plaintiffs (to affirmatively prove falsity or deception) to
defendants (to demonstrate that the challenged claims were true
and substantiated).”192
189. See, e.g., Fracker, 2009 WL 5865687, at *7 (holding that plaintiff could not
rely on FTC allegations to support false advertising claims).  In Fracker, the court
reasoned that the FTC is “empowered to determine whether a business practice is
unfair or deceptive” under its authority “granted by the FTC [Act].” See id.  In that
connection, the FTC Act “vests remedial power solely in the [FTC],” which provides
the FTC’s basis for bringing unsubstantiated advertising claims without otherwise
showing that the respective advertisement is false or misleading. See id. at *8 (em-
phasis added).  Thus, where the plaintiff sought to support a private false advertis-
ing claim by citing the FTC’s unsubstantiated advertising allegations against the
defendant, the Fracker court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, concluding that it was
essentially an “attempt to shoehorn a violation of the [FTC Act] . . . into a private
cause of action.” See id. at *7.
190. See, e.g., id. at *8 (“In short, the government . . . can sue an advertiser for
making unsubstantiated advertising claims; a private plaintiff cannot.” (citing Nat’l
Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharms., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 216-
17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
191. See, e.g., Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439, 456-57 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (“Thus, because there is no private remedy for ‘unsubstantiated advertising,’
private litigants are limited to claims for false or misleading advertising, which re-
quires supporting factual bases for such allegations.” (citing Fraker, 2009 WL
5865687, at * 8)).
192. MacLeod & Blynn, supra note 173, at 1 (asserting that “[t]he courts have
reasoned that recognition of such a theory of liability would inappropriately shift
the burden from plaintiffs (to affirmatively prove falsity or deception) to defend-
ants (to demonstrate that the challenged claims were true and substantiated.”); see,
e.g., Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., Civ. No. 09-9192, 2011 WL 2150128, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (noting that California Court of Appeals has “declined to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant to prove the veracity of its claim”), rev’d in
part on other grounds, 511 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2013); McCray v. The Elations
Co., No. EDCV 13-0242 JGB (OPx), 2013 WL 6403073, at * (C.D. Cal. July 12,
2013) (holding that allegations that defendant lacked substantiation for health
benefit claims “improperly ‘shift[ ] the burden of production to defendants’ to
prove that studies exist which substantiate its claim” (quoting King Bio Pharms., 133
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214); see also Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Safavi, supra note 19,
at 7 (citations omitted) (arguing that allowing prior substantiation doctrine “to be
used by individuals would impermissibly shift the burden of proof to defendants in
false advertising cases to show that their advertising claims, in fact, are
substantiated”).
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2. The Plaintiffs Alleged Improper Lack of Substantiation Claims
The claims against Vibram should fail as a matter of law be-
cause the plaintiffs’ allegations, on their face, relied solely on an
unsubstantiated advertising theory of liability.193  Indeed, the plain-
tiffs alleged that Vibram “claimed that wearing FiveFingers” would
confer “significant advertised health benefits.”194  In turn, the plain-
tiffs contended that Vibram’s “health benefit claims [were] false
and deceptive because FiveFingers are not proven to provide any of
the health benefits beyond what conventional running shoes pro-
vide,” and that “there [were] no well-designed scientific studies that
support [Vibram’s] health benefit claims regarding FiveFingers.”195
To state a false advertising claim, a plaintiff must allege facts
that affirmatively demonstrate a false or deceptive act by the defen-
dant.196  Moreover, private plaintiffs have no authority under state
DTPAs to bring unsubstantiated advertising claims.197  Correspond-
ingly, a private plaintiff may not establish that a defendant’s affirm-
ative product claim is false or deceptive by merely showing that it is
unsubstantiated.198  Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs rely on
the allegation that Vibram’s health benefit claims were unsup-
193. See infra notes 194-221 and accompanying text.
194. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3; Complaint, De
Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
195. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3 (emphasis ad-
ded); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
196. See, e.g., Fraker v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 6, 2009) (“To successfully allege a claim for false advertising, [the] [p]laintiff
has the burden to plead and prove facts that show that the claims that [the]
[d]efendant made in connection with the product are false or misleading.”).
197. See, e.g., id. at *8 (“In short, the government . . . can sue an advertiser for
making unsubstantiated advertising claims; a private plaintiff cannot.”); see also
Bronson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. C 12-04184, 2013 WL 1629191, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (“Challenges based on a lack of substantiation are left to
the Attorney General and other prosecuting authorities; private plaintiffs, in con-
trast, have the burden of proving that advertising is actually false or misleading.”
(citing King Bio Pharms, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214)).
198. See, e.g., Johns v. Bayer Corp., Civ. No. 09-1935, 2013 WL 1498965, at *40
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013) (stating that where plaintiff’s false advertising claims “are
based on ‘lack of substantiation’ rather than proof of falsity,” strength of defen-
dant’s evidence in support of its product claims “is irrelevant”); cf. Bronson, 2013
WL 1629191, at *8 (“A claim can survive a lack of substantiation challenge by, for
example, alleging studies showing that a defendant’s statement is false.”); see also
MacLeod & Blynn, supra note 173, at 1 (describing how federal courts in Califor-
nia, New Jersey, and Florida “have found that the theory that a claim is false be-
cause the defendant has not offered substantiation to prove it is true simply is not
cognizable under state consumer protection and false advertising laws” (citing
Franulovic v. Coca Cola Co., 390 Fed. App’x. 145, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2010); Pelkey v.
McNeil Consumer Healthcare, No. 10-61853, 2011 WL 677424, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
16, 2011); Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 09-9192, 2011 WL 2150128, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. May 19, 2011)).
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ported by scientific evidence, their false advertising claims must fail
as a matter of law.199
Independent of their lack of substantiation allegations, the
plaintiffs failed to plead facts that satisfied their burden to affirma-
tively demonstrate that Vibram’s health benefit claims are false or
deceptive.200  By comparison, in Scheuerman v. Nestle Healthcare Nutri-
tion, Inc.,201 the plaintiffs took issue with advertisements that touted
“a number of health benefits” associated with the defendant manu-
facturer’s nutritional supplement.202  Specifically, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the advertisements represented that the existence of
such health benefits was “clinically shown.”203  According to the
plaintiffs, these advertisements were false because the defendant
did not possess adequate support for its “clinically shown” claims.204
At summary judgment, the Scheuerman court observed, the
plaintiffs’ “attempt to transform what is essentially a prior substanti-
ation claim into a consumer fraud claim by arguing that [the defen-
dant’s] use of the words ‘clinically shown’ constitutes a false or
misleading statement.”205  “In order to demonstrate this,” the court
explained, the plaintiffs “must plead and prove that [the defen-
dant] lacked clinical support for the health benefits it attributed” to
the product.206  In evaluating the record before it, the court found
that the plaintiffs, “at best,” could prove that the defendant’s “sup-
199. See, e.g., Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439, 456-57 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (“Thus, because there is no private remedy for ‘unsubstantiated advertising,’
private litigants are limited to claims for false or misleading advertising, which re-
quires supporting factual bases for such allegations” (citing Fraker, 2009 WL
5865687, at * 8)).
200. See generally Amended Complaint, Bezdek, 2012 WL 2398011(failing to al-
lege facts to demonstrate falsity of Vibram’s health claims); Complaint, De Falco,
No. 12-07238 (same).
201. Nos. 10-3684, 10-5628, 2012 WL 2916827 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012).
202. See id. at *1-2 (providing factual background).
203. See id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that plain-
tiffs alleged defendant’s “clinically shown health benefit claims were deceptive be-
cause they were made without any reasonable basis for doing so and without
substantiating them”).
204. See id. (noting specifically that plaintiff alleged defendant “did not pos-
sess or rely upon any reasonable basis that substantiated these purported health
benefits”); id. at *7 (noting plaintiff alleged that “studies cited” by defendant in
support of its “clinically shown” claims “were not as conclusive” as defendant repre-
sented in its advertisements).
205. Id. at *7 (assessing plaintiff’s arguments in support of false advertising
claims).
206. Id. (asserting requirements for plaintiff to sustain false advertising
claims).  The court further explained, it is the “[p]laintiffs’ burden to affirmatively
prove that the ‘clinically shown’ . . . advertising claim is a false or misleading state-
ment and not merely one that is unsubstantiated.” Id.
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port underlying its claims of ‘clinically shown’ health benefits [was]
not as strong as it should be and do not substantiate those
claims.”207  On that basis, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, explaining that the evidentiary record was insuffi-
cient to “affirmatively prove that the ‘clinically shown’ . . . advertis-
ing claim [was] a false or misleading statement and not merely one
that is unsubstantiated.”208
Similarly, in Stanley v. Bayer Healthcare LLC,209 the plaintiff
brought false advertising claims based on allegations that the defen-
dant made deceptive advertising statements that probiotics in its
nutritional supplement “improve digestive and immune system
health.”210  In support of these assertions, the plaintiff contended
that the challenged health benefit claims were in conflict with “the
vast majority of generally accepted scientific literature.”211  There,
the court also granted summary judgment for the defendant.212
The Stanley court explained that the plaintiff’s claims were based
entirely on an alleged failure to substantiate.213  In any event, the
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to otherwise establish that
the health claims were “actually false” or might otherwise “mislead a
reasonable consumer.”214
207. Id. (evaluating whether plaintiff satisfied requirements for false advertis-
ing claims).
208. See id. at *8 (granting summary judgment for defendant).  The court
elaborated:
Plaintiffs do not present evidence that Nestle actually lacks scientific sup-
port for its ‘clinically shown’ claims or that such support does not exist;
they argue that this support should have been stronger.  This is insuffi-
cient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that Nestle’s ‘clinically
shown’ advertising claims ‘are actually false or misleading.’
Id.  The court emphasized that even if the plaintiffs could prove that the defen-
dant’s studies were not “sufficiently strong” to support the defendant’s affirmative
representations, the plaintiff could not establish a sufficient basis for relief under
New Jersey’s DTPA. See id. at *7.
209. No. 11-862, 2012 WL 1132920 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012).
210. See id. at *2 (summarizing plaintiff’s allegations).
211. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs alleged “[d]efendant’s claims about the
benefits of the Products ‘are not substantiated by the vast majority of generally
accepted scientific literature currently available relating to probiotics’”).
212. See id. at *10 (granting summary judgment for defendant).
213. See id. at *4 (holding that alleged “lack [of] proper scientific substantia-
tion . . . . does not render claims false and misleading” under state DTPA).
214. See id. at *5 (“[N]one of [p]laintiff’s experts . . . . explain how those
statements might mislead a reasonable consumer.  Instead, [p]laintiff’s experts re-
peatedly assert the statements are rendered false or misleading due to a lack of
substantiation.”).  In Stanley, the plaintiff also presented evidence that the defend-
ants failed to comply with the substantiation requirements set forth by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A). See id. at *6.  However,
the court held that the defendant’s compliance with the FDCA had no bearing on
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s false advertising claims, not only because the re-
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In the Vibram lawsuits, the plaintiffs alleged not only that
Vibram’s health benefit claims were unsubstantiated, but also that
Vibram misrepresented the extent to which those claims were sup-
ported by scientific evidence.215  In support of these averments, the
plaintiffs’ complaints cited to scientific literature that purportedly
contradicts the veracity of Vibram’s health benefit representa-
tions.216  However, as alleged, the articles merely suggest that cer-
tain members of the scientific community believed that existing
studies were insufficient to fully understand the benefits and risks
associated with barefoot running.217  Furthermore, the plaintiffs ex-
pressly stated, “there is no adequate scientific proof supporting
[d]efendants’ representations.”218  Thus, like in Scheuerman and
Stanley, the plaintiffs failed to affirmatively demonstrate that
Vibram’s health claims were not supported by scientific evidence.219
Instead, the allegations establish, at most, that the evidence in sup-
port of Vibram’s health benefit claims was not as strong as it should
be, or that its claims were “unsubstantiated.”220  Accordingly, the
plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that Vibram
cord failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant vio-
lated such regulations, see id. at *7, but also because the plaintiff lacked authority
to prosecute violations of FDA regulations, see id. at *6 (citing King, 133 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 212); see also King, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212 (“[P]rosecuting authorities, but
not private plaintiffs, have the administrative power to request advertisers to sub-
stantiate advertising claims before bringing actions for false advertisement . . . .”).
215. See Amended Complaint,, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 20 (“Although
there is no reliable scientific proof demonstrating that FiveFingers actually provide
those health benefits, Defendants’ marketing and advertising conveys that there is
such reliable scientific proof.”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 21
(same).
216. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (citing scien-
tific studies and literature); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (same).
217. The studies cited by the Plaintiffs indicated, for example, that
“[r]esearch is ongoing,” and that “professional organizations and many clini-
cians . . . are going to be reluctant to support or oppose barefoot running until
more definitive research and evidence are available.” Amended Complaint, Bezdek,
supra note 18, paras. 42-43; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 42-43 (same).
218. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 41 (emphasis ad-
ded); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 41 (same).
219. See Scheuerman v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition, Inc., Nos. 10-3684, 10-
5628, 2012 WL 2916827, at *7 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs’ show-
ing that scientific evidence contradicted defendant’s “clinically shown” health ben-
efit claims failed to establish that defendant’s advertising claims were false);
Stanley, 2012 WL 1132920, at *2-4 (granting summary judgment for defendant
where plaintiff alleged that defendant’s health benefit claims were not substanti-
ated by “the vast majority of generally accepted scientific literature” because such
substantiation was not required).
220. See Scheuerman, 2012 WL 2916827, at *7 (holding that plaintiffs could not
carry burden of showing false or deceptive advertising claim by demonstrating that
scientific evidence in support of “clinically shown” health benefit claims was “not as
strong as it should be” and did not “substantiate those claims”).
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made representations that were actually false or misleading, and
not merely unsubstantiated.221
3. The Plaintiffs’ Claims Inappropriately Shift the Burden to Vibram to
Establish That Their Advertisements Were True and
Substantiated
The claims against Vibram should similarly fail because the al-
legations seek to relieve the plaintiffs of their burden to affirma-
tively show that Vibram’s advertisements are false or deceptive, and
correspondingly, would require Vibram to demonstrate that its ad-
vertisements are true and substantiated.222  Even drawing the infer-
ence that Vibram represented that its health benefit claims were
supported by “competent and reliable” scientific evidence, the
plaintiffs failed to plead factual allegations that, if true, would dis-
prove the existence of such scientific evidence.223  Accordingly, if
the plaintiffs were permitted to sustain their false advertising claims
on these allegations, Vibram would be required to affirmatively set
forth supporting evidence in order to avoid liability.224
Recent case law illustrates why the Vibram plaintiffs’ allega-
tions are insufficient to sustain their false advertising claims.225  In
221. See id.; Stanley, 2012 WL 1132920, at *3-4.  The plaintiffs effectively at-
tempted to import the FTC’s “competent and reliable scientific evidence” standard
for health claim substantiation. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18,
para. 3 (alleging there are no “well-designed” studies to support Vibram’s health
claims); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).  However, the plaintiffs
failed to plead any facts to support an inference that Vibram claimed to rely on
“competent and reliable scientific evidence,” let alone “well-designed scientific
studies subject to traditional scientific scrutiny, including being performed by im-
partial parties who conducted appropriately powered double-blinded, placebo-
controlled studies, which were subjected to peer review or other methods tradi-
tionally used by the scientific community to ensure accurate results.” See Amended
Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para.39 (asserting that Vibram lacked support for
health claims); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 39 (same). See Fracker v.
Bayer Corp., 2009 WL 5865687, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009) (dismissing plain-
tiff’s claim for false advertising because plaintiff alleged only that defendant had
“no reasonable basis, consisting of competent and reliable scientific evidence to
substantiate” its health-benefit advertising claim).
222. See sources cited infra notes 223-242 and accompanying text (arguing
that allegations would improperly shift burden of proof to Vibram).
223. The plaintiffs’ allegations merely purport to show that Vibram’s health
benefit claims were not supported by adequate scientific evidence.  See generally
Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (alleging that Vibram
lacked “adequate support” for its health-benefit representations); Complaint, De
Falco, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (same).
224. See, e.g., Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., Civ. No. 09-9192, 2011 WL 2150128,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (“[T]he California Court of Appeal . . . [has] de-
clined to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to prove the veracity of its
claim.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 511 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2013).
225. See infra notes 226-235 and accompanying text.
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Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,226 the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant made false or deceptive advertising claims that that its dietary
supplement contained ingredients that were “good for the health
and comfort of joints.”227  In support of her assertions, the plaintiff
alleged that scientific studies confirmed the ingredients, in fact, were
not associated with the claimed health benefits.228  Specifically, the
plaintiff cited to a National Institute of Health study, which alleg-
edly concluded that the ingredients did not promote joint health
and comfort.229  Under those circumstances, the court held that the
plaintiff’s allegations could not be classified as a lack of substantia-
tion claim.230
There, the Eckler court explained, “[t]here’s really no deny-
ing . . . that [the plaintiff’s] claims are based almost exclusively on
her allegations that the purported benefits . . . either: (1) are com-
pletely unsubstantiated by [the defendant]; or (2) have been dis-
proved by the scientific community.”231  However, the court
reasoned that “(1) and (2) aren’t necessarily the same thing.”232
According to the court, “[t]here is a difference, intuitively, between
a claim that has no evidentiary support one way or the other and a
claim that’s actually been disproved.”233  Therefore, the court distin-
guished respectively between claims “about a product that [have]
been disproved (which [are] closer to an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion) and [claims] about a product for which there’s no proof at all
(which is closer to an unsubstantiated claim).”234  Thus, the court
concluded, “[t]o the extent [plaintiff] points to studies that alleg-
edly debunk” the claimed benefits, the plaintiff isn’t just alleging
“those benefits are unsubstantiated[,]” she is alleging they “are pos-
itively false.”235
226. No. 12-CV-727, 2012 WL 5382218 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012).
227. See id. at *1 (providing factual background).
228. See id. at *2 (explaining that plaintiff alleged “[s]cientific studies con-
firm” ingredients are inefficacious).
229. See id. (citing study that found “[g]lucosamine and chondroitin sulfate
alone or in combination did not reduce pain effectively in the overall group of
patients with osteoarthritis of the knee”).
230. See id. at *3. (“[T]he Court simply doesn’t see this as a ‘lack of substantia-
tion’ case.”).
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. See id.
235. See id.  For a further illustration of the distinction between lack of sub-
stantiation allegations and affirmative misrepresentation allegations, compare id.
at *3-4 (finding that plaintiff alleged affirmative misrepresentation), and Hughes v.
Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d. 439, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that plaintiff al-
leged affirmative misrepresentation), with Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. CV 09-
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Unlike in Eckler, the factual allegations by the Vibram plaintiffs,
if true, would not disprove the existence of barefoot running’s pur-
ported health benefits, nor would they disprove the existence of sci-
entific evidence to support those benefits.236  Notably, the
plaintiffs’ complaints plainly asserted: “[p]laintiff cannot, without
discovery, know the details of the bases for [d]efendants’ deceptive
claims . . . [h]owever, the above-mentioned health benefits claims
were not and are not based on well-designed scientific studies.”237  Fur-
thermore, while the plaintiffs’ allegations purport to deny the exis-
tence of competent and reliable support for Vibram’s health benefit
claims, the factual allegations do not support such an inference.238
To the contrary, the articles cited by the plaintiffs merely suggest,
for example, there is a need for “more definitive research and evi-
dence,”239 and that Vibram’s statements were not based on adequate
scientific evidence.240  Accordingly, as exemplified by Eckler, the
plaintiffs’ allegations effectively amount to lack of substantiation
claims rather than affirmative misrepresentation claims.241  As a re-
sult, the plaintiffs’ claims would inappropriately shift the burden to
9192, 2011 WL 2150128, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (finding that plaintiff
alleged improper lack of substantiation claim).
236. See generally Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (fail-
ing to allege facts to disprove existence of evidence supporting health benefits);
Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 40-56 (same); cf. Scheuerman v. Nestle
Healthcare Nutrition, Inc., Nos. 10-3684, 10-5628, 2012 WL 2916827, at *7 (D.N.J.
July 17, 2012) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiffs only
proved that support for “clinically shown” claims was “not as strong as it should
be”).
237. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 39 (emphasis ad-
ded); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 39 (same).
238. See supra note 221.
239. For example, the Plaintiffs cited to the APMA Position Statement, supra
note 68, which indicates that “[r]esearch is ongoing,” and “professional organiza-
tions and many clinicians . . . are going to be reluctant to support or oppose bare-
foot running until more definitive research and evidence are available.  See
Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 42-43; Complaint, De Falco, supra
note 18, paras. 42-43 (same).
240. For example, the Plaintiffs alleged that Vibram’s health benefit claims,
“were not and are not based on well-designed scientific studies.” See Amended
Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 39; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para.
39 (same).
241. Compare Stanley v. Bayer Healthcare LLC, No. 11-862, 2012 WL 1132920,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012) (finding that plaintiff plead improper lack of substan-
tiation claim where allegations showed defendant’s health benefit claims con-
flicted with “the vast majority of generally accepted scientific literature”), with
Eckler, 2012 WL 5382218, at *3-4 (finding that plaintiff plead facts that constituted
allegations of affirmative misrepresentation).
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Vibram to affirmatively demonstrate that their advertisements were
true and substantiated.242
B. The Claims Against Vibram Should Fail as a Matter of Law
Because the Truthfulness of Vibram’s Health Benefit Claims is a
Matter of Scientific Judgment, and Vibram Can Demonstrate
Scientific Support for Its Health Benefit Claims
1. Matters of Scientific Debate Cannot Form the Basis of a False
Advertising Claim
False advertising laws “proscribe[ ] conduct that, but for its
false or misleading character, would be protected by the First
Amendment.”243  Accordingly, courts must be vigilant “not to per-
mit” false advertising claims “to intrude on First Amendment val-
ues.”244  Moreover, the First Amendment is particularly concerned
with safeguarding academic freedom,245 preserving an “uninhibited
marketplace of ideas,”246 and permitting “the free flow of commer-
cial information.”247  Thus, false advertising claims raise particular
242. See, e.g., Stanley, 2012 WL 1132920, at *3 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“The purpose of allowing only prosecuting authorities,
and not private persons, to seek substantiation of advertising claims . . . is to pre-
vent undue harassment of advertisers and provide the least burdensome method
of obtaining substantiation for advertising claims.”); see also Gaul v. Bayer Health-
care LLC, No. 12-5110, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *2, 8-9 (D.N.J. Feb. 11,
2013) (holding that plaintiff failed to satisfy burden of establishing falsity or decep-
tion where plaintiff alleged that decision by National Advertising Division found
that sole study supporting the defendant’s advertising claims “was unreliable”).
243. See ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“Because the [Lanham] Act proscribes conduct that, but for its false or
misleading character, would be protected by the First Amendment, free speech
principles inform our interpretation of the Act.”).
244. See id. (affirming that “ ‘we have been careful not to permit overexten-
sion [of false advertising laws] to intrude on First Amendment values’” (quoting
Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003))); see also Boule, 328 F.3d at 91
(citations omitted) (“As always with the public expression of opinion, ‘we have
been careful not to permit overextension of the Lanham Act to intrude on First
Amendment values.’”).
245. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (declaring that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom,” and “[t]hat freedom is . . . a special concern of the First
Amendment”).
246. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (observing “First
Amendment’s purpose ‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail’” (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984))).
247. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763-64 (1976) (holding that both individual consumers and society have
strong First Amendment interests in “free flow of commercial information”).
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First Amendment concerns where they turn on commercial infor-
mation regarding a matter of scientific debate.248
The United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence recognizes that both individual consumers and society have
substantial interests in “the free dissemination of information about
commercial choices in a market economy.”249  Indeed, the Court
has held that where advertisements convey “truthful information”
on matters of public interest, “the First Amendment interest served
by such speech [is] paramount.”250  Therefore, false advertising
claims may not be utilized to “suppress truthful, nondeceptive, [or]
noncoercive speech.”251
Conversely, in recognition of the “greater potential for decep-
tion or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages,”
the Court has held that advertisements may be subject to greater
248. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 496-99 (observing that false advertising claims raise
numerous First Amendment concerns where they challenge statements made in
connection with ongoing scientific discourse); see also Arthur v. Offit, No. 01:09-cv-
1398, 2010 WL 883745, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2010) (noting that courts have
“justifiable reticence about venturing into the thicket of scientific debate”).
249. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 520 (1996) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (declaring that in “case after case follow-
ing Virginia. Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court, and individual Members of the Court, have
continued to stress the importance of free dissemination of information about
commercial choices in a market economy”).  In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the Su-
preme Court held that in light of the nation’s “free enterprise economy,” both
individuals and society have strong First Amendment interests in the “free flow of
commercial information.” See 425 U.S. at 765.  The Court explained that individ-
ual consumers have an economic interest in maintaining access to a wide range of
commercial information for purposes of making informed transactional decisions.
See id. at 763 (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commer-
cial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day’s most urgent political debate.”).  Moreover, according to the Court,
society’s interest in assuring informed participation in the market economy is tan-
tamount. See id. at 765 (describing how “allocation of our resources in large mea-
sure . . . [is] made through private economic decisions,” and it is matter of public
interest that such decisions “in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed”).
In that respect, the Court explained that “even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of [commercial] information does
not serve that goal.” Id. (footnote omitted).
250. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding
that commercial speech is “clearly protected by the First Amendment” where it
“convey[s] truthful information relevant to important social issues”).
251. See Cent. Hudson Gas Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (holding that government may only restrict commercial speech that “is
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity” in order to further substantial
government interest); see also Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 774 (holding that
states may not “completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful in-
formation about entirely lawful activity” based on fear “of that information’s effect
upon its disseminators and its recipients”).
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regulation than other forms of noncommercial speech.252  The
Court has repeatedly emphasized, however:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our so-
cial and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish.  Some of the ideas and information
are vital, some of slight worth.  But the general rule is that
the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess
the value of the information presented.  Thus, even a com-
munication that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First
Amendment.253
Likewise, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,254 the Court recently elab-
orated that government regulations may not be used to “burden
252. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65 (“In light of the greater potential for deception
or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages . . . content-based re-
strictions may be permissible.” (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982); Fried-
man v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 (1979)); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2672 (2011) (“It is true that content-based restrictions on protected expres-
sion are sometimes permissible, and that principle applies to commercial speech.
Indeed the government’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from ‘com-
mercial harms’ explains ‘why commercial speech can be subject to greater govern-
mental regulation than noncommercial speech.” (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993))); see also Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-65 (noting
“‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transac-
tion . . . and other varieties of speech”).  The Supreme Court has prescribed a four-
part test for analyzing government restrictions of commercial speech. See Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (establishing commercial speech framework).  First, courts
evaluate whether the commercial speech is false, misleading, or related to unlawful
activity. See id.  “For commercial speech to receive [First Amendment] protection,
‘it must at least concern lawful activity and not be misleading.’” See Bolger, 463 U.S.
at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).  Second, the restriction must be
justified by a substantial government interest. See Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
Third, the regulation must “directly advance the governmental interest asserted.”
See id.  Fourth, the restriction must be “narrowly drawn” to “directly advance” the
asserted government interest. See id. at 565-66 (directing courts to evaluate
whether restriction “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve” asserted inter-
est); c.f. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188
(1999) (interpreting the third and fourth prongs as requiring restrictions to be
narrowly tailored and “carefully calculated” to directly advance the government
interest in consideration of “costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Additionally, in
44 Liquormart, a plurality held that complete bans of commercial speech are “par-
ticularly dangerous” and warrant more careful constitutional scrutiny. See 517 U.S.
at 501.
253. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767
(1993)); accord Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 503-04; United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 411
(2001).
254. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred
direction.”255
These competing principles illustrate that allowing private
plaintiffs to bring false advertising lawsuits is uniquely problematic
where, as here, the purportedly false statements reflect one side of
an evolving debate in the scientific community.256  In that respect,
unlike false commercial speech, “statements of pure opinion—that
is, statements incapable of being proven false—are [generally] pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”257  Supreme Court precedent
demonstrates, however, that “the line between fact and opinion is
not always a clear one.”258  Consequently, there is little doubt that
the fact-opinion distinction is particularly problematic in connec-
tion with statements concerning a matter of scientific debate.259
255. Id. at 2671 (“The State may not burden the speech of others in order to
tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”).
256. See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (holding that restrictions on prescrip-
tion drug advertisements violated First Amendment where state could not establish
restrictions “[would] prevent false or misleading speech” and “[s]tate’s interest in
burdening the speech . . . turn[ed] on nothing more than a difference of opin-
ion”); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-75 (holding that First Amendment barred state from
prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements containing truth-
ful information on “important public issues such as venereal disease and family
planning” based on asserted interests in “(1) shield[ing] recipients of mail from
materials that they are likely to find offensive and (2) aid[ing] parents’ efforts to
control the manner in which their children become informed about sensitive and
important subjects such as birth control”); see also 44 Liquormart, 527 U.S. at 510
(holding that states “[do] not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, non-
misleading information for paternalistic purposes”).
257. See ONY Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990)).
258. See id. (evaluating Supreme Court’s holding in Milkovich v. Lorain Jour-
nal Co., 479 U.S. 1 (1990), regarding First Amendment distinction between state-
ments of fact and opinion).
259. See id. at 497 (“Where, as here, a statement is made as part of an ongoing
scientific discourse about which there is considerable disagreement, the traditional
dividing line between fact and opinion is not entirely helpful.”); see also Arthur v.
Offit, No. 01:09-1398, 2010 WL 883745, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2010) (citing
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21) (“Plaintiff’s claim . . . threatens to ensnare the Court in
the thorny and extremely contentious debate over the perceived risks of certain
vaccines, their theoretical association with particular diseases or syndromes, and, at
bottom, which side of this debate has ‘truth’ on their side.  That is hardly the sort
of issue that would be subject to verification based upon a ‘core of objective evi-
dence.’”).  In ONY, the Second Circuit explained that statements made in the
course of scientific academic discourse – and specifically, conclusions contained in
scientific journal articles – are, “in principle, ‘capable of verification or refutation
by means of objective proof.’” See 720 F.3d at 496 (quoting Phantom Touring, Inc.
v. Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 728 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992)).  However, in considera-
tion of the realities of the “scientific method” and the nature of scientific academic
discourse, the court observed that courts are “ill-equipped” to evaluate such con-
clusions as statements of empirical fact for purposes of the First Amendment. See
id. at 496-97 (“Needless to say, courts are ill-equipped to undertake to referee such
controversies.  Instead, the trial of ideas plays out in the pages of peer-reviewed
47
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For such reasons, judicial opinions of the lower federal courts have
recently suggested that courts should avoid consideration of legal
questions that turn on the veracity of particular viewpoints concern-
ing debates in the scientific community.260  In other words, these
decisions suggest, where the truthfulness or falsity of advertising
claims is a matter of scientific debate, such claims should be consid-
ered non-actionable.261
Most notably, in ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc.,262 the
Second Circuit applied comparable reasoning to false advertising
claims.263  The plaintiff in ONY was a pharmaceutical company that
journals, and the scientific public sits as the jury.”).  Hence, the court held that
statements made “as part of an ongoing scientific discourse about which there is
considerable disagreement” are “more closely akin to matters of opinion” for pur-
poses of the First Amendment. See id. at 497.
260. See, e.g., id. at 496-97 (declaring that “courts are ill-equipped to . . . refe-
ree” matters pertaining to scientific academic discourse); cf. United States ex rel.
Jones v. Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 678 F.3d 72, 87 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We
agree with the district court that ‘[e]xpressions of opinion, scientific judgments, or
statements as to conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be
false.” (quoting United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625
(S.D. Ohio 2000)); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Scien-
tific controversies must be settled by the methods of science rather than by the
methods of litigation.  More papers, more discussion, better data, and more satis-
factory models – not larger awards of damages – mark the path toward superior
understanding of the world around us.” (citations omitted)); Arthur, 2010 WL
883745, at *6 (“Courts have a justifiable reticence about venturing into the thicket
of scientific debate, especially in the defamation context.”); Padnes v. Scios Nova,
Inc., No. 95-1693, 1996 WL 539711, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996) (“Medical
researchers may well differ with respect to what constitutes acceptable testing pro-
cedures, as well as how best to interpret data garnered under various protocols.”);
Faltas v. State Newspaper, 928 F. Supp. 637, 649 (D.S.C. 1996) (noting that an
editorial on homosexuality involved highly controversial topic “not . . . easily sus-
ceptible (if at all) to ‘proof’ one way or the other”); see also United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2564 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that “there are broad
areas” such as the vast annals of philosophy “in which any attempt by the state to
penalize purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger
of suppressing truthful speech”).
261. See, e.g., ONY, 720 F.3d at 497-99 (holding that conclusions advanced in
scientific journals regarding novel areas of research are non-actionable as matter
of law); Arthur, 2010 WL 883745, at *5-6 (holding that statements made in course
of highly publicized scientific debate are non-actionable as matter of law).
262. 720 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2013).
263. See id. at 498 (holding advertisements touting conclusions advanced in
scientific journals concerning novel areas of research non-actionable under both
Lanham Act and New York’s DTPA). But see Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc.,
775 F.3d 230, 235-37 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that First Amendment does not cre-
ate per se bar on false advertising claims concerning “commercial statements relat-
ing to live scientific controversies” made in “commercial advertisements . . .
directed at consumers”); cf. Adv. Tech. Corp., Inc. v. Instron, Inc., —- F. Supp. 3d.
—-, No. 1:12-cv-10171, 2014 WL 7236336 (D. Mass Dec. 18, 2014) (citing Brigham
& Women’s Hosp., 678 F.3d at 88 (holding that First Amendment did not bar com-
mercial disparagement claim where statements in industry magazine concerned
matter of “ongoing scientific debate,” but did not present “questions of scientific
48
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took issue with a competitor’s marketing campaign, which allegedly
touted “scientific findings that were intentionally deceptive and
misleading” with respect to the relative effectiveness of their com-
peting products.264  The statements at issue were based on a com-
parative study of the two products, which was funded by the
defendant company for promotional purposes.265  The scientific
study concluded that the defendant’s product was comparatively
more effective than the plaintiff’s, and its findings were subse-
quently published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.266  Shortly
thereafter, the defendant company “issued a press release touting
[the article’s] conclusions and distributed promotional materials
that cited [its] findings.”267
The ONY plaintiff brought false advertising claims in connec-
tion with the defendant’s efforts to promote the comparative
study’s conclusions.268  In support of its claims, the plaintiff alleged
that the article contained “five distinct incorrect statements of fact
about the relative effectiveness” of the two products.269  There, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the article’s content
and findings could not form the basis of a false advertising claim.270
The court explained, “[in] a sufficiently novel areas of research,”
judgment”).  For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Eastman and its inter-
pretation of ONY, see infra notes 275 & 279.
264. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 496, 499 (describing plaintiff’s allegations that de-
fendant’s promotional materials contained “intentionally deceptive and mislead-
ing” scientific findings).
265. See id. at 493 (discussing allegations concerning comparative product
study).
266. See id. at 493-94 (discussing study’s findings and subsequent publication).
267. See id. at 495 (explaining allegations concerning defendant’s subsequent
touting of scientific findings for promotional purposes).
268. See id. at 496 (explaining that plaintiff alleged defendant’s “touting and
distributing the article’s findings for promotional purposes” gives rise to false ad-
vertising claim).  The plaintiff brought false advertising claims against the authors
of the study in addition to the defendant pharmaceutical company under both the
Lanham Act and New York’s DTPA. See id. at 496 (discussing claims arising out of
article’s publication), 498-99 (discussing claims arising out of subsequent touting
and distribution of article’s conclusions).  With regard to the scientific findings
and the subsequent publication thereof, the plaintiff contended that the authors
of the study deliberately compiled selective data and omitted factors from the cal-
culations to support a “favorable conclusion.” See ONY v. Cornerstone Therapeu-
tics, Inc., No. 11-1027, 2012 WL 1835671 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (detailing
allegations concerning defendant’s payment for study), aff’d 720 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2013).
269. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 494 (discussing plaintiff’s allegations that article
contained false statements of fact).
270. See id. at 498 (granting defendant pharmaceutical company’s motion to
dismiss false advertising claims against it).
49
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conclusions “presented in publications directed to the relevant sci-
entific community . . . . may be highly controversial and subject to
rigorous debate by qualified experts.”271  Consequently, the court
held “that publication of a controversial scientific article qualified
as protected academic speech, the accuracy of which should not be
adjudicated by the courts.”272
The holding in ONY is particularly noteworthy, however, be-
cause the court extended this reasoning to the defendant com-
pany’s subsequent touting and dissemination of the article’s
findings for marketing purposes.273  In that respect, the court indi-
cated that the plaintiff’s claims would necessarily turn on the con-
tent of the scientific study itself.274  Therefore, the court believed it
would be inappropriate to evaluate the related tortious interference
allegations, because the truthfulness of the challenged advertising
claims was effectively a matter of scientific judgment.275
271. See id. at 497 (providing underlying reasoning for conclusion that alleg-
edly false or deceptive advertising claims were non-actionable as matter of law).
272. See Recent Case, First Amendment—False Advertising—Second Circuit Affirms
That Dissemination of Scientific Publications Cannot Be False Advertising Under The Lan-
ham Act.—ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1815 (2014) [hereinafter Second Circuit Affirms That
Dissemination of Scientific Publications Cannot Be False Advertising Under The Lanham
Act) (analyzing Second Circuit’s holding in ONY); see also ONY, 720 F.3d at 498
(holding that article’s conclusions were non-actionable under either Lanham Act
or New York’s DTPA).
273. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 498 (holding that subsequent dissemination of pro-
tected academic speech for marketing purpose could not form basis of connected
tortious interference claim).
274. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 498-99 (evaluating plaintiff’s claims arising out of
subsequent touting and distribution of article’s findings for promotional pur-
poses).  The court noted that the “plaintiff’s objection” was not that the defendant
“distorted the articles findings,” but rather, the plaintiff’s theory of liability was
that the defendant “present[ed] accurately the article’s allegedly inaccurate con-
clusions.” See id. at 499.
275. See id. at 499 (dismissing claims arising out of subsequent touting and
distribution where plaintiff’s theory was that defendants accurately presented alleg-
edly inaccurate conclusions contained in non-actionable article).  The court af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal of claims arising out of the subsequent touting
and distribution of the article’s allegedly false conclusions based on its “correct
conclusions that (a) the article itself was non actionable and (b) the tortious inter-
ference claim did not separately allege any additional misleading statements.” Id.
The court noted: “We are therefore presented with a much easier case than we
would be if a plaintiff alleged that a defendant distorted an article’s findings in its
promotional materials. Id.Conversely, in Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit recently diverged from ONY in rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to false advertising claims premised on “commercial statements relating to live sci-
entific controversies.” See 775 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2014).  In Eastman, a plastic
manufacturer brought a false advertising lawsuit under the Lanham Act against a
competing company. Id.  At issue were statements contained in the defendant’s
marketing materials, which were “distributed . . . at trade shows and directly to
potential customers,” and purported to show the plaintiff’s products “could be
50
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The First Amendment has a strong interest in protecting the
free flow of truthful commercial information.276  As such, recent
decisions such as ONY support the proposition that advertising
statements cannot form the basis of false advertising claims where
the challenged statements regard a matter of evolving scientific de-
bate.277  This assumption is particularly strong where the chal-
lenged statements are supported by opinions reflected in scholarly
journals, and involve novel issues of public concern.278  Accord-
ingly, under such circumstances, claims in advertisements should
only be actionable to the extent that they distort or manipulate the
scientific findings on which they rely.279
harmful for humans.” Id.  The allegedly false statements were premised on the
findings of a scientific study published in a peer-reviewed journal; however, the
materials did not provide “the full context of the scientific paper.”  Eastman Chem.
Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d. 756, 761 (W.D. Tex. 2013), affd. 775 F.3d
230 (5th Cir. 2014); see Eastman, 775 F.3d at 232.On appeal, the defendant cited to
ONY in contending that the First Amendment precluded the jury’s finding of lia-
bility because “commercial statements relating to live scientific controversies
should be treated as [opinions] protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 235.
There, the court upheld the jury’s findings, concluding that although the commer-
cial statements concerned the subject of an evolving debate in the scientific com-
munity, the statements at issue were “made in commercial advertisements and
directed at customers,” as distinguished from ONY which addressed “statements
made within academic literature and directed at the scientific community.” See id. at 235-
36 (emphasis added); see also Eastman, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (explaining that
unlike in ONY, the “scientific debate” at issue in Eastman, “moved from the pages
of academic journals to commercial advertisements targeted at consumers”).  In
that respect, citing to the Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, the
Fifth Circuit concluded, “it is of no monument that the commercial speech in this
case concerned a topic of scientific debate,” reasoning that “commercial claims”
are not entitled to the level of First Amendment protection afforded “discourse in
the pages of academic journals.” See id. at 236-37.
276. See supra note 249 (describing First Amendment interest in free flow of
commercial information).
277. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 496-98 (discussing principles underlying conclusion
that courts should not evaluate truth or falsity of statements connected with “ongo-
ing scientific discourse”); cf. Arthur, 2010 WL 883745, at *4 (holding that state-
ments made in connection with highly publicized public debate on vaccine safety
constituted “speech about important matters of public concern,” and could not
form basis of defamation claim).
278. See id. at 496-97 (“Importantly, those conclusions are presented in publi-
cations directed to the relevant scientific community, ideally in peer-reviewed aca-
demic journals that warrant that research approved for publication demonstrates
at least some degree of basic scientific competence.”); Arthur, 2010 WL 883745, at
*3 (explaining that “both the nature of [a] statement—including that it was quot-
ing an advocate with a particular scientific viewpoint and policy position—and the
statement’s context—a very brief passage in a lengthy description of an ongoing,
heated public health controversy—confirmed that this [was] a protected expres-
sion of opinion”).
279. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 498 (concluding that dissemination of marketing
materials that accurately conveyed scientific findings could not form basis of a false
advertising action, but noting that a more difficult case would arise “if a plaintiff
alleged that a defendant distorted [such] findings in its promotional materials”);
51
Calo: Deceptive Advertising or Evolving Science? How "Barefoot Running"
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 122 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 122 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 52 27-JUL-15 10:27
580 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 529
2. Vibram’s Health Benefit Claims are Non-Actionable Because They
Accurately Promote Studies and Opinions Reflected in Scientific
Journals Concerning the Subject of an Evolving Debate in
the Scientific Community
In the Vibram Lawsuits, the plaintiffs alleged that Vibram’s
health benefit claims were false or deceptive because they were un-
supported by reliable scientific evidence.280  However, several mem-
bers of the scientific community have reached similar conclusions
regarding the efficacy of barefoot running.281  Furthermore, the
precise health benefit claims at issue are the subject of ongoing re-
search and debate within the scientific community.282
In response to the plaintiffs’ allegations, Vibram could present
evidence that its health benefit claims reflect opinions expressed in
scholarly journals by members of the scientific community.283  Con-
sequently, the plaintiffs’ false advertising claims would necessarily
require a fact finder to evaluate the adequacy and validity of the
scientific evidence supporting Vibram’s health benefit claims.284
cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (internal citations
omitted) (affirming that commercial speech “at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading” to receive Constitutional protection). But see Eastman, 775
F.3d at 237 (rejecting argument that First Amendment bars false advertising claims
where underlying statements “embrac[e] one side of a scientific debate”).  In East-
man, the Fifth Circuit appears to interpret the Second Circuit’s holding in ONY
with regard to protected scientific opinions as limited to “statements made within
the academic literature and directed at the scientific community.”  775 F.3d at 236.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not fully address the First Amendment issues related
to the ONY defendant’s secondary distribution of scientific findings for promo-
tional purposes. See id. at 237 (distinguishing ONY on basis that nature of defen-
dant’s secondary distribution was “dissimilar,”  claims addressing secondary
distribution in ONY did not arise under Lanham Act, and noting that court was not
bound by ONY); see also Eastman, 969 F. Supp. at 761 & n.3 (asserting that ONY is
not binding and discussing factual distinctions, but noting that ONY Court con-
cluded that “secondary distribution of excerpts of such an article cannot give rise
to liability” so long as it is not misleading” (quoting ONY, 720 F.3d at 492)); Second
Circuit Affirms That Dissemination of Scientific Publications Cannot Be False Advertising
Under The Lanham Act., supra note 272, at 1816 (noting that ONY court did not
conclude that secondary dissemination of findings constituted a “secondary act of
speech”).
280. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3 (“Defendants’
health benefit claims are false and deceptive because FiveFingers are not proven to
provide any of the health benefits beyond what conventional running shoes pro-
vide.”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
281. See supra note 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing scientific litera-
ture supporting Vibram’s health benefit claims),
282. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text (discussing ongoing debate
in scientific community regarding health benefits of barefoot running).
283. See supra note 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing scientific litera-
ture supporting Vibram’s health benefit claims).
284. Cf. ONY, 720 F.3d at 496-98 (concluding that courts should not under-
take to evaluate content of promotional materials that accurately conveys scientific
52
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Accordingly, to the extent that Vibram can demonstrate that their
statements regarding the health benefits of barefoot running are
supported by scientific studies, and that it did not distort or misrep-
resent the findings of such studies, Vibram should be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because the health benefit claims con-
stitute non-actionable matters of scientific judgment.285
Under this legal theory, it appears that Vibram could set forth
evidence that would strongly support a summary judgment ver-
dict.286  First, the plaintiffs alleged that Vibram “implicitly and ex-
plicitly” claimed that the health benefits of barefoot running were
supported by reliable scientific research.287  In support these asser-
tions, the plaintiffs only pointed to statements by Vibram reflecting
that the health benefits were supported by “ample evidence,” and
“have long been supported by scientific research.”288
In response, Vibram could demonstrate that since 1987, nu-
merous articles in peer-reviewed scientific journals have hypothe-
sized that barefoot running was associated with greater health
benefits and lower injury rates than running in cushioned shoes.289
Furthermore, Vibram’s specific health benefit claims are directly
linked to the findings of Daniel E. Lieberman’s study of barefoot
running, which were published in a peer-reviewed scientific jour-
nal.290  Lieberman’s findings were derived from a comparative
study of habitual barefoot runners and runners who have worn
findings published in academic journal in connection with ongoing scientific
debate).
285. See id. at 492, 498 (holding that secondary distribution of “statements of
scientific conclusions about unsettled matters of scientific debate” for marketing
purposes cannot create basis for tortious interference claim at least insofar as de-
fendant did not distort such conclusions).
286. See supra note 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing scientific conclu-
sions supporting Vibram’s health benefit claims).
287. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, para. 3 (“Defendants
claim implicitly and explicitly that scientific research shows that their expensive
FiveFingers . . . will provide certain ‘health benefits’ that traditional running shoes
do not provide.”); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 3 (same).
288. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 26, 33 (citing ad-
vertising statements by Vibram that health benefits of barefoot running are sup-
ported by scientific evidence); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 27, 33
(same).  Although the plaintiffs inferred that Vibram represented the existence of
“well-designed scientific studies,” see Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18,
para. 39; Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 39 (same), no factual allegations
supported such an inference, see supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text
(describing lack of supporting factual allegations).
289. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing pre-2010 schol-
arly articles that support Vibram’s health benefit claims).
290. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing Lieberman’s
findings).
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cushioned shoes their entire lives, which evaluated five subject
groups in a variety of conditions.291  Without evaluating the veracity
of these scientific opinions, it does not appear that Vibram dis-
torted their findings, nor does it appear that Vibram misrepre-
sented the extent to which its health benefit claims were supported
by scientific evidence.292
Second, the plaintiffs contended that Vibram’s health benefit
claims were deceptive because they misrepresented the existence of
countervailing health risks associated with barefoot running.293
However, this assertion is not supported by the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations, and could be affirmatively disproven by Vibram.294
Vibram’s marketing efforts disseminated substantial information
concerning the injury risks associated with barefoot running, and
how to minimize such risks.295  Moreover, the qualified manner in
which Vibram’s marketing efforts contrasted the health benefits of
barefoot running with the potential injury risks reflects the position
of experts such as Lieberman.296  Consequently, in this respect,
Vibram’s health benefit claims are also supported by scientific
evidence.297
Finally, the plaintiffs broadly contended that as a whole,
Vibram’s “uniform nationwide marketing campaign” misrepre-
sented the extent to which scientific evidence supports the exis-
tence of barefoot running’s unique health benefits.298  However,
291. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing methodology uti-
lized in Lieberman’s 2010 study).
292. Compare supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing Lieber-
man’s study and findings), with supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing FiveFingers marketing campaign).
293. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 46-56 (citing
sources that allegedly contradict Vibram’s representation of health risks associated
with barefoot running); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, para. 46-56 (same).
294. See generally Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18 (demonstrating
there are no factual allegations to support plaintiffs’ claims that Vibram misrepre-
sented injury risks associated with FiveFingers and barefoot running); Complaint,
De Falco, supra note 18 (same).
295. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Bezdek, supra note 106, at 5-6 (discuss-
ing Vibram’s marketing representations regarding injury risks associated with bare-
foot running).
296. Compare Running Barefoot: Running Before the Modern Running Shoe, supra
note 39 (describing Lieberman’s position concerning potential injury risks associ-
ated with transition to barefoot running and providing instructions on making
gradual transition); with Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Bezdek, supra note 106, at
5-6 (detailing aspects of Vibram’s marketing campaign that provided information
regarding injury risks associated with barefoot running and how to safely
transition).
297. See supra notes 293-296 and accompanying text.
298. See Amended Complaint, Bezdek, supra note 18, paras. 2-3 (alleging that
Vibram’s “extensive, comprehensive, and uniform nationwide marketing cam-
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there is strong evidence to demonstrate that the FiveFingers mar-
keting campaign, as a whole, was largely informational, and con-
veyed truthful information reflecting the scientific community’s
evolving knowledge of barefoot running.299  Most notably, Vibram
launched an “educational fitness resource portal” that provided ac-
cess to emerging research on barefoot running.300  Moreover, the
vast majority of Vibram’s promotional efforts were accomplished
through word of mouth and its association with the barefoot run-
ning movement.301  Indeed, Vibram deliberately developed the
FiveFingers “brand,” for example, through product reviews, rather
than advertisements, in major newspapers and running
publications.302
In light of these factors, Vibram’s health benefit claims should
constitute non-actionable matters of scientific opinion.303  Upon
presentation of the evidence discussed above, the claims could only
be resolved by evaluating the veracity of the scientific evidence that
supports Vibram’s health benefit claims.304  Furthermore, to the ex-
paign” made “false and misleading” representations regarding scientific support
for health benefit claims); Complaint, De Falco, supra note 18, paras. 2-3 (same); see
also Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *1 (D. Mass
Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining plaintiff alleges that Vibram’s “advertising campaign
was false and misleading because it misrepresented not only the health benefits of
FiveFingers, but also the extent to which such health benefits have been scientifi-
cally corroborated”).
299. Compare supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (detailing scientific ev-
idence supporting Vibram’s health benefit claims), with supra notes 69-83 and ac-
companying text (discussing FiveFingers marketing campaign); see also supra notes
80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Vibram’s efforts to become “leader in the
barefoot running movement” and informational components of Vibram’s market-
ing campaign).
300. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing Vibram’s “edu-
cational fitness resource portal”).
301. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text (discussing various aspects
of Vibram’s marketing efforts).
302. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing Vibram’s efforts
to develop FiveFingers “brand”).
303. See ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496-99
(2d Cir. 2013) (holding that product manufacturer cannot be held liable for false
advertising based on defendant’s touting conclusions advanced in scientific jour-
nals concerning ongoing scientific debate, at least to extent that defendant did not
distort the scientific evidence); Arthur v. Offit, Civ. No. 01:09-1398, 2010 WL
883745, at *4-6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2010) (holding that defamation claims fail as
matter of law where they would require court to determine truth or falsity of state-
ments made in course of highly publicized scientific debate); see also Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 US 60, 73-74 (finding that consumers have strong
First Amendment interest in having access to truthful commercial information on
matters of public debate, which enables them to make “informed decisions in
[the] area”).
304. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 498-99 (indicating that false advertising claims
should fail as matter of law where resolving such claims would require court to
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tent that Vibram’s health benefit claims are valid, the FiveFingers
marketing campaign substantially contributed to the marketplace
of commercial information.305  In that regard, allowing judges or
juries to consider these claims would create an unacceptable risk of
suppressing truthful information concerning an ongoing debate in
the scientific community.306  Accordingly, Vibram should be enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.307
VI. BEYOND BAREFOOT RUNNING: PRACTICAL TAKEAWAYS FROM
THE VIBRAM LAWSUITS
The Vibram Lawsuits highlight a number of concerning trends
for consumer product manufacturers.308  First, and most important,
is the escalating prevalence of private false advertising claims under
state DTPAs.309  In that regard, such lawsuits have increasingly
targeted producers of consumer goods, and have attacked non-
traditional forms of advertising such as social media marketing.310
evaluate veracity of matters of scientific judgment concerning ongoing debate in
scientific community).
305. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 782-83 (1976) (holding that First Amendment protects consum-
ers’ right to receive commercial information regarding drug prices from
pharmacy).
306. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 497 (declaring that “courts are ill-equipped to un-
dertake to referee” the veracity of statements that are the subject of ongoing de-
bates in the scientific community”); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S.
484, 503 (1996) (holding that “the First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of . . . attempts to deprive consumers of accurate information about their
chosen products”).
307. See ONY, 720 F.3d at 498 (indicating that false advertising claims fail as
matter of law where cause of action turns on whether statement concerning matter
of scientific debate is false or deceptive).
308. See infra notes 309-315 and accompanying text (discussing trends high-
lighted by Vibram Lawsuits).
309. See Theodora McCormick, Food Advertising and Labeling Trends Spark Con-
cerns About Compliance and Litigation, ASPATORE, Sept. 2013, 2013 WL 5760775, at *1
(“False advertising class actions have been on the rise, with many trial lawyers hop-
ing that they would replace tobacco litigation as the next cash cow.”); see also Van
H. Beckwith, Litigating Food and Beverage Labeling Cases: Some Strategies and Trends,
ASPATORE, Aug. 2013, 2013 WL 5293057, at *1 (asserting that consumer fraud
claims are “one of the most explosive trends in our court system”).
310. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *1 (explaining that combination of
poor economy, legal developments making it more difficult to establish consumer
fraud claims against securities and financial products industries, and increasing
FTC and FDA scrutiny of “advertisers of commercial goods,” have led “many class-
action lawyers to seize on false advertising suits as the ‘next big thing’”); Vanessa C.
Hew, Managing Advertising Law in the Modern World, ASPATORE, July 2013, 2013 WL
4188244, at *2 (describing how “the evolving landscape of the Internet and social
media advertising has led to the emergence of novel issues in advertising law”); see
also Christie Grymes Thompson, Applying the Advertising Regulation and Litigation
Framework Within the Context of New Technologies, ASPATORE, Jul. 2013, 2013 WL
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Consequently, companies such as Vibram must take affirmative
steps to scrutinize their own advertising practices in order to limit
the scope of potential liability.311
Second, there is a considerable cost disparity between bringing
and defending these types of claims.312  Indeed, these cases are in-
expensive for plaintiffs to prepare and file, however, “they can be
extremely expensive to defend.”313  Thus, while plaintiffs “have
been largely unsuccessful” in litigating such claims on the merits,
many defendants, such as Vibram, have elected to enter early settle-
ment agreements in light of the “significant legal costs in defending
these suits as well as the risk of a substantial damages award.”314  As
a result, it is imperative for defense attorneys to pursue legal strate-
gies that allow defendants to combat false advertising claims at the
early stages of litigation.315
A. Suggested Strategies Before Litigation Arises
Companies should take a number of ex-ante steps to diminish
the probability of false advertising lawsuits, and to maximize the
availability of efficient defense strategies in the event that such law-
suits do arise.  First, recent trends indicate that false advertising law-
suits target specific industries in waves, and correlate with FTC (or
Food and Drug Administration) scrutiny of the advertising prac-
tices within such industries.316  Accordingly, companies should pay
4188240, at *10 (predicting that “we will continue to see great emphasis on mobile
marketing and privacy issues in the area of advertising law”).
311. See infra notes 316-325 and accompanying text (discussing possible ways
to minimize risk of false advertising liability before litigation arises).
312. See The Possible Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at *3-4 (explaining how cost of
litigating false advertising claims is substantially more burdensome for defendants
than plaintiffs).
313. See id. at *3 (“Attorneys can find plaintiffs easily and the cases are inex-
pensive to prepare and file, but they can be extremely expensive to defend.”).
314. See id. at *4 (explaining that “[d]espite the limited success plaintiffs’ law-
yers have had actually litigating these cases . . . . many companies are electing
to . . . settle these suits early on” because of “significant legal costs in defending
these suits as well as the risk of a substantial damages award”).
315. See Beckwith, supra note 309, at *13 (noting that consumer class actions
under state DTPAs “continue to generate a significant volume of opinions,” and
suggesting that defense attorneys utilize emerging strategies in efforts to defeat or
narrow lawsuits early in litigation).
316. See Sokolowski, supra note 4 (noting trend of lawsuits against athletic
footwear manufacturers arising after FTC’s heightened scrutiny of industry and
enforcement of advertising laws against several manufacturers); McCormick, supra
note 26, at *1 (contending that “stepped up enforcement by the FTC and FDA”
has led to increase in consumer false advertising claims); see also Rosenfeld &
Blynn, supra note 173, at 68 (discussing increased prevalence of “piggyback”
lawsuits).
57
Calo: Deceptive Advertising or Evolving Science? How "Barefoot Running"
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 125 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 125 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 58 27-JUL-15 10:27
586 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 529
close attention to the FTC’s investigation and enforcement trends,
and take prudent measures to comply with prevailing compliance
standards.317
Second, companies should evaluate any affirmative product
claims to ensure that they adhere to relevant FTC substantiation
requirements.318  Doing so will not only diminish the risk of FTC
scrutiny, but also increase the likelihood that private claims will
amount to improper lack of substantiation allegations.319  Moreo-
ver, any advertisements touting scientific support for performance,
health, or nutritional benefits should receive exceptional scru-
tiny.320  In that regard, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in ONY
represents a powerful precedent in support of the proposition that
false advertising claims may not challenge the merits of scientific
evidence.  Nevertheless, the court left open the question of the ex-
tent to which courts should consider allegations that a defendant
distorted or manipulated such evidence.321  Thus, companies
should confirm that any scientific evidence claims accurately re-
present the relevant findings, and do not exaggerate or distort the
extent to which their product claims are supported by scientific
evidence.322
317. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *4 (detailing importance of taking steps
to comply with prevailing substantiation requirements); see also Thompson, supra
note 310, at *9-10 (explaining that FTC increasingly investigates online advertising
practices, and noting importance of staying “on top of what is happening at the
FTC”).
318. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *4 (advising that advertisers should
scrutinize their advertising claims to ensure compliance with substantiation
requirements).
319. See, e.g., Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-717, 2012 WL 5382218, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (declaring that consumer false advertising claims must
be supported by factual allegations showing advertiser’s product claims or scien-
tific evidence claims are demonstrably false to avoid constituting improper lack of
substantiation claim).
320. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *4 (advising that advertisers should give
“additional scrutiny” to any product claims “touting performance, health or nutri-
tional benefits”).
321. See ONY v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 498 (2d Cir.
2013) (holding that promotional materials touting scientific findings concerning
ongoing debate in scientific community cannot form basis of false advertising
claims); supra notes 262-273 and accompanying text (analyzing ONY).  But see ONY,
720 F.3d at 498 (explaining that court was “presented with a much easier case
than . . . if a plaintiff alleged that a defendant distorted an article’s findings in its
promotional material”); supra notes 275, 279 (describing how Fifth Circuit distin-
guished ONY in Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir.
2014).
322. See McCormick, supra note 26, at *4 (encouraging advertisers to enact
“appropriate vetting process” to ensure that any advertising claims touting “per-
formance, health or nutritional benefits . . . do not exaggerate the truth”).
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Third, companies must diligently monitor their online and so-
cial media marketing practices.323  As exemplified by the FiveFin-
gers marketing campaign, companies increasingly utilize social
media and non-traditional forms of online marketing to promote
their products.  While this can be “both highly effective . . . and, in
today’s culture, crucial to most companies’ sales and marketing ef-
forts,” it also poses unique compliance challenges.324  Conse-
quently, it is increasingly necessary for companies to develop
uniform strategies and policies for their marketing campaigns, and
to implement regimented procedures to ensure across the board
compliance with such standards.325
B. Suggested Strategies for After Litigation Arises
Despite the recent influx of consumer false advertising claims,
the Vibram Lawsuits provide a useful platform to evaluate a number
of promising strategies for defending these types of lawsuits.  First,
whenever prudent, defendants should argue at the motion to dis-
miss stage that the plaintiff alleged an improper lack of substantia-
tion claim.326  In recent years, a large number of private false
advertising claims have relied on lack of substantiation theories of
liability.  At the same time, however, courts have increasingly re-
jected plaintiffs’ attempts to disguise what are effectively unsubstan-
tiated advertising allegations.  Notably, in Johns v. Bayer Corp.,327 the
federal district court for the Southern District of California recently
held that where a plaintiff’s claims are based on “‘lack of substantia-
tion’ rather than proof of falsity,” “the strength of [the defendant’s]
evidence is irrelevant.”328
323. Thompson, supra note 310, at *7 (encouraging companies to enact pro-
cedures to monitor their online advertising content).
324. See Emily Neisloss Roisman & Brian Socolow, Social Media Marketing: Cag-
ing the Un-Caged Tweeter, ACC DOCKET, Nov. 2013, at 82, 88 (“Despite the myriad
risks – legal and reputational – social media marketing is both highly effective and,
in today’s culture, crucial to most companies’ sales and marketing efforts.”); see also
id. at 84 (“It is easy to forget that social media is really a form of advertising, and
therefore, subject not only to the terms of use under the specific platform . . . but
also to federal and state laws and regulations, as well as industry self-regulatory
guidelines.”).
325. See id. at 88 (suggesting that implementing “well-drafted social media
policy” and “comprehensive monitoring and compliance program can help mini-
mize the risks” associated with non-traditional forms of marketing).
326. See Beckwith, supra note 309, at *10 (encouraging defense attorneys to
utilize lack of substantiation arguments as efficient strategy for defending con-
sumer false advertising claims).
327. No. 09-1935, 2013 WL 1498965 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013)
328. Id. at *40 (“Accordingly, in the absence of affirmative scientific evidence
available during the Class Period that lycopene does not support prostate health,
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Second, defendants should attempt to remove false advertising
claims to federal court in order to avail themselves of the height-
ened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b).329  Under those circumstances, where false advertising claims
challenge the veracity of affirmative advertising claims, plaintiffs
must clear two pleading hurdles – plaintiffs must: (1) place their
claims “outside of the ‘lack of substantiation’ category”; and (2)
plead sufficient facts to the pleading requirements under [Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure] 8, 9(b), and 12(b)(6) with regard to
showing that a defendant’s advertising claims are demonstratively
false or misleading.330  Accordingly, in recent cases, defendants
have succeeded on motions to dismiss by arguing that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy Rule 9(b), even where the allegations were sufficient
to avoid the “lack of substantiation category.”331
Finally, attorneys should explore developing legal trends to de-
fend these types of lawsuits.  As discussed above, the proposition
the strength of Bayer’s evidence is irrelevant and Plaintiffs’ claims are based on
‘lack of substantiation’ rather than proof of falsity.”).
329. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring plaintiffs “alleging fraud or mistake . . .
[to] state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”); see,
e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
“stringent pleading restrictions of Rule 9(b)” apply to state consumer protection
act claims in federal district court).
330. See Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(explaining where claims fall “outside the ‘lack of substantiation’ category . . . a
different legal analysis [comes] into play, namely, sufficiency of the pleadings
under Rules 8, 9(b), or 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-717, 2012 WL
5382218, at *7 (S.D. Cal Nov. 1, 2012) (explaining that although plaintiff’s claims
fell outside lack of substantiation category, plaintiff’s allegations failed to “lend
‘facial plausibility’ to her claims that [defendant’s] representations were “false or
misleading”); Hughes, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (considering “whether plaintiffs’
claims pass muster under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement” after de-
termining that plaintiffs allegations did not amount to “stand-alone lack of sub-
stantiation claims”).
331. See, e.g., Eckler, 2012 WL 5382218, at *5-7 (holding that although allega-
tions were sufficient to avoid dismissal as improper lack of substantiation claims,
plaintiff’s false advertising claim failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standard
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)); see also Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Cos.,—F. Supp. 2d.
—, No. 13-4692, 2014 WL 4244329, at *4-5 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) (hold-
ing that although plaintiff did “not merely allege[ ] a non-actionable ‘lack of sub-
stantiation’ claim,” plaintiff failed to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 by pleading “with the
requisite ‘plausibility’” to support allegations that defendant’s health benefit ad-
vertising claims were “affirmatively misleading” (citations omitted)). But see Ester,
930 F. Supp. 2d at 464-47 (holding that plaintiff did not bring “stand-alone lack of
substantiation claims,” and allegations in support of false advertising claims satis-
fied Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528,
536-38 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (holding that plaintiff’s allegations in support of false
advertising claims did not amount to “‘lack of scientific substantiation’ theory,”
and satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
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that “matters of scientific judgment cannot form the basis of a false
advertising claim” appears to be a promising legal theory for de-
fendants.332  Another noteworthy example (which arose in connec-
tion with Vibram’s motion to dismiss the Bezdek action) is the
question of whether a private plaintiff can satisfy the injury element
of a false advertising claim by relying on a “price premium” theory
of injury.333  In Bezdek, the court held that a “price premium” injury
was cognizable under the respective statutes, and that the plaintiff
“adequately plead such injury.”334  However, the court directly ac-
knowledged that the theory of a “price premium” injury itself in-
volves an underdeveloped area of law, and “has been the subject of
much dispute.”335  Consequently, under different factual circum-
stances, or in other jurisdictions, defendants could potentially suc-
ceed in arguing that a plaintiff fails to state a cognizable injury by
merely alleging that he or she paid a “premium” as a result of a
defendant’s deceptive advertising claims.336
VII. CLOSING REMARKS
By the early twentieth century, legislatures recognized that the
increasing size and power of businesses had rendered common law
332. See supra notes 243-307 (analyzing “matters of scientific judgment” theory
as potential defense strategy).
333. See Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., No. 12-10513, 2013 WL 639145, at *5-8
(D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (analyzing price premium theory of injury under Florida
and Massachusetts law); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (defining
“price premium” injury).
334. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *6 (holding that “price premium” theory
of injury is cognizable under Massachusetts and Florida law, and plaintiff alleged
such injury).
335. See id. at *5 (“This so-called ‘price premium’ theory of injury has been
the subject of much dispute.”); see generally id. at *5-6 (surveying small scope of
cases addressing “price premium” theory of injury).
336. For example, in Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Hosp., the First Circuit held, as a
matter of law, that a plaintiff could not establish a price-premium injury where the
plaintiff allegedly purchased and previously administered to her dog, defective
heartworm pills. See 607 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2010).  The court observed that the
pills protected the plaintiff’s dog from heartworms, and the defect did not mani-
fest itself in injury to her or her dog. See id.  On that basis, the court concluded
that the plaintiff “received the full benefit of the bargain she anticipated when she
purchased” the heartworm pills. See Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Hosp., 604 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 296 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d 607 F.3d 250 (1st Cir. 2010).  Conversely,
in Bezdek, the court concluded that the plaintiff established a price premium injury
because she was a “current owner of FiveFingers shoes,” and allegedly would not
have purchased the FiveFingers had she known that they would not convey the
anticipated health benefits touted by Vibram. See Bezdek, 2013 WL 639145, at *6
(holding that plaintiff’s allegations established price-premium injury under Massa-
chusetts law); see also Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d —, Nos. 12-10513,
13-10764, 2015 WL 223786, at *7-8, 10-12, 14-15 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2015) (discuss-
ing “price-premium” injury in connection with Vibram Lawsuits settlement).
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remedies and traditional principles of caveat emptor inadequate to
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices.
Despite their common origins, and the analogous language con-
tained in contemporary state and federal consumer protection laws,
the provision of private actions under state DTPAs has enabled pri-
vate enforcement under “little-FTC Acts” to extend far beyond the
forward-looking and remedial policy objectives embodied in the
FTC Act of 1914.337  Indeed, many of the precise reasons that Con-
gress refused to provide for private enforcement of the FTC Act are
exemplified by the recent influx of private false advertising
lawsuits.338
As demonstrated by the Vibram Lawsuits, the increasing preva-
lence of private false advertising lawsuits under state DTPAs poses
novel challenges for product manufacturers such as Vibram.  Corre-
spondingly, however, such lawsuits also raise serious concerns for
increasingly sophisticated consumers by deterring companies from
promoting innovative products, and restricting novel research and
evolving scientific discoveries from the marketplace of commercial
information.339
The Vibram Lawsuits provided a useful platform for evaluating
new strategies to address this changing legal climate.  This Com-
ment proposed that two emerging legal theories could be utilized
as viable defense strategies for the quick and efficient resolution of
comparable false advertising claims.  It also demonstrated, however,
that the escalating prevalence of consumer false advertising claims
337. Cf. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119, at 5 (“[W]hen states adopted
[consumer protection acts] . . . . [they] failed to fully appreciate Congress’s con-
cerns with creating a private right of action for such a broad range of conduct.”);
Sovern, supra note 125, at 437 (arguing “one significant difference” that results
from providing private consumers “the same unfettered discretion accorded the
FTC and state agencies . . . [is] individual consumers exercise that discretion in
favor of their own concerns, rather than for the public welfare”).
338. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 119 at 15 (arguing that all concerns
raised during congressional debates surrounding passage of FTC Act of 1914 “ring
true as we consider how private rights of action should be interpreted under state
[DTPAs]”).
339. See Lemley, supra note 117, at 325-26 (“The internet has caused a signifi-
cant change in the amount of information available to consumers.  With greater
information access has come greater sophistication, as consumers are able to bet-
ter research firms and their goods and services.  More importantly, the internet
provides a speech forum for dissatisfied consumers to discuss their experience with
other potential consumers, so the dissatisfied consumer has much more power
today to induce corrective action than the consumer of the 1960s or 1970s. . . .
Now that consumers are less vulnerable and more sophisticated, consumers are
engaging in opportunistic behavior by applying [little FTC acts] beyond their in-
tended scope.  If courts support this opportunistic behavior through literal inter-
pretations of little FTC acts, it will cause destructive market effects.”).
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has generated a rapidly evolving field of law.  Consequently, as this
area continues to develop, it is critical for practitioners to be aware
of potential emerging challenges, and to continue seeking new
strategies to avoid litigation and successfully defend claims when
they do arise.
Joshua T. Calo*
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. Franklin
and Marshall College, 2011.
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